Suchergebnisse
Filter
42 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
Private debt composition and the political economy of IMF lending
In: Working paper series / Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 04/05
World Affairs Online
Response to Timothy J. Sinclair's Review of Banks on the Brink: Global Capital, Securities Markets, and the Political Roots of Financial Crises
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 1082-1083
ISSN: 1541-0986
To the Brink of Destruction: America's Rating Agencies and Financial Crisis. By Timothy J. Sinclair. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021. 228p. $39.95 cloth
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 1083-1085
ISSN: 1541-0986
This Time Should Have Been Different: The Causes and Consequences of Macroeconomic Policy Failure in the Great Recession
In: Prepared for "Understanding Challenges to the Contemporary Global Order," Filzbach, Switzerland, October 6-7, 2017
SSRN
Working paper
Master or servant? common agency and the political economy of IMF lending
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 49-77
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
World Affairs Online
Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending
In: International Studies Quarterly, Forthcoming
SSRN
Michael Breen. 2013. The politics of IMF lending (New York: Palgrave MacMillan)
In: The review of international organizations, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 125-130
ISSN: 1559-744X
Picking Up (and Rearranging) the Pieces: The Politics of Global Financial Governance in the Wake of the Great Recession
In: Governance Challenges and Innovations, S. 30-61
Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 49-77
ISSN: 1468-2478
Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 1-27
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
Banks on the brink: global capital, securities markets, and the political roots of financial crises
In: Political economy of institutions and decisions
"Banks on the Brink explains why some countries are more prone to systemic bank failures than others. We focus on the political decisions that shape the structure of financial markets and the international economic forces that make some countries especially vulnerable to financial instability. We highlight the effects of two variables in combination: foreign capital inflows and financial market structure - specifically, the relative prominence of securities markets versus commercial banking in the domestic financial system. Foreign capital is the fuel for banks' potentially dangerous behavior, whereas banks are more likely to take on excessive risks when operating in a financial system with large securities markets. The study of banking necessarily leads to a focus on politics, but not in the way that many observers might imagine. Bankers themselves have political preferences and may express them publicly, and some banks lobby for favorable public policies and donate to political campaigns and political action committees. But at a deeper level, banks are embedded in financial markets, which themselves reflect an accumulation of government choices. Banks today operate in an environment shaped by these choices, some of which make banks more resilient, others of which make them more prone to crisis."
Partisan Technocrats: How Leaders Matter in International Organizations
In: Global studies quarterly: GSQ, Band 1, Heft 3
ISSN: 2634-3797
AbstractInternational organizations make policy decisions that affect the lives of people around the world. We argue that these decisions depend, in part, on the political ideology of the organization's chief executive. In this study, we investigate the influence of the leader of one of the most powerful international organizations: the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We find that when the Managing Director is politically left of center, the IMF requires less labor market liberalization from borrowing countries in exchange for a loan. We also find evidence suggesting that the Managing Director's influence on labor-related loan conditions is independent of the Fund's most powerful members, including the United States. While Managing Directors rarely engage in overtly political behavior, they appear to act as "partisan technocrats" whose ideology influences international financial rescues and specifically the conditions attached to countries' loans, which shape the distributive consequences of IMF lending.
Partisan technocrats: how leaders matter in international organizations
International organizations make policy decisions that affect the lives of people around the world. We argue that these decisions depend, in part, on the political ideology of the organization's chief executive. In this study, we investigate the influence of the leader of one of the most powerful international organizations: the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We find that when the Managing Director is politically left of center, the IMF requires less labor market liberalization from borrowing countries in exchange for a loan. We also find evidence suggesting that the Managing Director's influence on labor-related loan conditions is independent of the Fund's most powerful members, including the United States. While Managing Directors rarely engage in overtly political behavior, they appear to act as "partisan technocrats" whose ideology influences international financial rescues and specifically the conditions attached to countries' loans, which shape the distributive consequences of IMF lending.
BASE
Tipping the (Im)balance: Capital inflows, financial market structure, and banking crises
In: Economics & politics, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 179-208
ISSN: 1468-0343
AbstractAn emerging consensus among scholars and policy‐makers identifies foreign capital inflows as one of the primary determinants of banking crises in developed countries. We challenge this view by arguing that external imbalances are destabilizing only when banks face substantial competition from securities markets in the process of financial intermediation. We assemble a dataset of banking crises covering the advanced industrialized countries from 1976 to 2011 and find evidence of a conditional relationship between capital inflows, a well‐developed securities market, and the incidence of banking crises. We further explore the impact of capital inflows on banks' actual risk taking as indicated by their capital adequacy levels and measures of insolvency risk. Our results demonstrate that prudential capital cushions tend to decline with the combination of capital inflows and prominent securities markets. We highlight the political decisions—often made during the early days of a country's financial development—that determine the relative prominence of banks vs. non‐bank financial institutions and conclude with policy recommendations.