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Michael Breen. 2013. The politics of IMF lending (New York: Palgrave MacMillan)
In: The review of international organizations, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 125-130
ISSN: 1559-744X
Picking Up (and Rearranging) the Pieces: The Politics of Global Financial Governance in the Wake of the Great Recession
In: Governance Challenges and Innovations, S. 30-61
Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 49-77
ISSN: 1468-2478
Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 54, Heft 1, S. 1-27
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
Trade, institutions, and the timing of GATT/WTO accession in post-colonial states
In: The review of international organizations, Band 7, Heft 1
ISSN: 1559-744X
Prior to 1995, when the World Trade Organization (WTO) superseded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a number of states took advantage of GATT Article XXVI:5(c), which allowed them-as former colonies or component territories of existing GATT members-to quickly and simply join the multilateral trade regime. The speed with which these post-colonial accessions took place, however, varied widely: some states joined immediately upon independence, while others joined much later. Still other post-colonial states passed on this opportunity, only to subsequently begin the longer, more onerous accession process required of other GATT/WTO applicants. Our paper seeks to explain this variation in the timing of post-colonial states' accession to the GATT/WTO. We argue that three key variables explain the timing of accession decisions: 1) a country's trade ties with existing member-states; 2) its existing preferential trade agreement (PTA) commitments; and 3) its domestic political institutions-specifically, the country's level of democracy. Furthermore, we argue that the effects of these variables are conditional upon each other: post-colonial countries with more extensive trade ties to existing member-states were more likely to accede rapidly under Article XXVI:5(c), but only under specific conditions-namely, when they had not already locked in ties with key trading partners through bilateral or regional PTAs, and when they were governed by a more democratic regime. We test this argument empirically using an original dataset of 61 post-colonial states from 1951 to 2004. Our results strongly support this explanation of GATT/WTO accession and help to clarify the pattern of participation in the multilateral trading system that we have observed over the last half-century. Adapted from the source document.
Trade, institutions, and the timing of GATT/WTO accession in post-colonial states
In: The review of international organizations, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 81-107
ISSN: 1559-744X
Design in Context: Existing International Agreements and New Cooperation
In: International organization, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 471-493
ISSN: 1531-5088
AbstractThis research note highlights an important element missing from rational design theories of international agreements: "institutional context"—the presence or absence of existing and prior agreements between prospective partners in "new" cooperation. If, as rational design theorists argue, agreement design is deliberate, strategic, and directed toward enhancing contracting parties' ability to credibly commit to future cooperation, then prior design "successes" should influence the terms of additional cooperation. We test for this omitted variable problem in three agreement design outcomes:ex antelimitations on agreement duration, exit clauses, and dispute-settlement provisions. Through an augmentation and reanalysis of data from a key study in the rational design literature—Barbara Koremenos's "Contracting Around International Uncertainty"—we show institutional context is positively correlated with inclusion ofex antetime limitations in negotiated agreements and negatively correlated with the inclusion of exit clauses and third-party dispute-settlement provisions. Institutional context also mediates and conditions the effects of the explanatory variable at the heart of existing rational design theories—uncertainty about the future distribution of gains from cooperation. Our findings show that the collective appeal of particular design features varies not only with the nature of underlying strategic problems, but also with degrees of shared institutional context.
Design in Context: Existing International Agreements and New Cooperation
In: International organization, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 471-493
ISSN: 0020-8183
Ties that Bind? Preferential Trade Agreements and Exchange Rate Policy Choice
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 385-399
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
Ties that Bind? Preferential Trade Agreements and Exchange Rate Policy Choice
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 385-399
ISSN: 1468-2478
Financial Regulation, Monetary Policy, and Inflation in the Industrialized World
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 70, Heft 3, S. 663-680
ISSN: 1468-2508
Financial Regulation, Monetary Policy, and Inflation in the Industrialized World
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 70, Heft 3, S. 663-680
ISSN: 0022-3816
Bridging the Silos
In: The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade
doi=10.1017/S1537592712000370
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 545-547
ISSN: 1537-5927