Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- Naturalism : epistemology, and metaphysics -- Why naturalism? -- Four epistemological challenges to ethical naturalism : naturalized epistemology and the first-person perspective -- Moral naturalism and self-evident moral truths -- Moral necessities in a contingent world -- Referring to moral properties -- Realist-expressivism : a neglected option for moral realism -- Milk, honey, and the good life on moral twin Earth -- Referring to moral properties : moral twin Earth, again -- Naturalism and normativity -- Moral naturalism and three grades of normativity -- The Ring of Gyges : overridingness and the unity of reason -- The normativity of self-grounded reason.

Abstract
This comment addresses two issues that arise in Sacconi/Faillo/Ottone's essay. The first is the problem of compliance as it arises in social contract theory. The second is the problem of avoiding an incoherence that arises in the formulation of welfarist principles of distributive justice if these principles are taken to be concerned with the distribution of welfare without restriction. Sacconi, Faillo, and Ottone define an interesting class of principles that govern only the distribution of 'material utility', which they distinguish from 'conformist utility'. Sacconi, Faillo, and Ottone are primarily concerned, however, to argue that there is a need to revise 'the utility maximization model of a rational economic man'. I discuss this claim briefly, in concluding the paper.

In this essay, I propose a standard of practical rationality and a
grounding for the standard that rests on the idea of autonomous agency.
This grounding is intended to explain the "normativity" of the
standard. The basic idea is this: To be autonomous is to be
self-governing. To be rational is at least in part to be
self-governing; it is to do well in governing oneself. I
argue that a person's values are aspects of her
identity—of her "self-esteem identity"—in
a way that most of her ends are not, and that it therefore is plausible to
view action governed by one's values as self-governed. This
is also plausible on independent grounds. Given this, I say, rational
agents comply with a standard—the "values
standard"—that requires them to serve their values, and to
seek what they need in order to continue to be able to serve their
values.