Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Notes Regarding the Texts -- Introduction -- 1. The Condition of Man without Government -- The Law of Nature -- Inconveniences of the State of Nature -- The Rule of Reason -- 2. The Rule of Law -- Individual Consent and Majority Rule -- The Principle of Majority Rule -- The Limits of Consent and Compulsion -- The Meaning and Limits of the Rule of Law -- 3. Prerogative and the Limitsof Legislative Supremacy -- The Need for Prerogative -- Redefining Prerogative -- Beyond Political Society -- Beyond Obligation, Consent, and the Social Compact -- Prerogative and Absolute Monarchy -- Judging the Exercise of Prerogative -- 4. Resistance, Revolution,and the Limits of Politics -- Resistance and the Right of Self-Preservation -- Locke's Doctrine of Revolution -- Diffi culties Regarding Revolution -- Heaven and a Stable Commonwealth -- 5. The Lockean Commonwealth -- An Outlook, Not a Constitution -- Th e People and Popular Philosophy -- 6. Justifying Secular Politics -- Locke and Religious Toleration -- Justifying the Commonwealth -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Z.

AbstractThe essay clarifies the relationship between Locke's political and his religious thought. To the extent that Locke's political thought is an outgrowth of a particular strand of Christianity, its claims to universality would be significantly diminished. Several plausible interpretations of his political thought rely on his religiosity. Others maintain that this religiosity was a façade. Close attention to Locke's analysis of the Hebrew text of Gen. 1:28 unambiguously points to a critique of the Bible on semantic grounds. Locke subtly argues that the wording of the Bible makes the interpretation of scripture by scripture alone impossible. The fact that Locke goes out of his way to critique the Bible refutes interpretations of Locke's thought that rely on his religiosity and reestablishes the universalist claims of his political thought.

AbstractThis article addresses Andrew Rehfeld's attempt to ensure a place for
political theory within political science, which he does partly by
showing how political theory fits into a defensible definition of
political science and partly by excluding much political theory from
the discipline in order to safeguard the rest. His account of what
the discipline should comprehend is overly narrow, however, and does
not serve the interests of the sorts of political theory he strongly
believes are worth doing. I argue instead that political science
must be defined by its subject matter alone, and that political
theory's contribution to this subject matter must be defended.