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Richard Cordray served for six years as the first Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. He was appointed by President Barack Obama and confirmed by a bipartisan vote of the Senate. During his tenure, the Bureau returned over $12 billion to 30 million Americans, handled 1.3 million consumer complaints that resolved many individual problems, and adopted new rules to safeguard the mortgage market that caused the financial crisis of 2008 and the deep recession that followed. He is the author of Watchdog, released in March 2020, about consumer protection and the role and importance of the CFPB. Before joining the Consumer Bureau, Rich served as Ohio's Attorney General, where he and his team recovered over $2 billion for Ohio's retirees, investors, and business owners and took major steps to protect consumers from fraudulent foreclosures and financial predators. He also served as Ohio Treasurer, where he led the State's banking, investment, debt, and financing activities. He previously taught at Ohio State's law school and served as a state legislator and as Ohio's first Solicitor General. Rich has argued seven cases before the U.S. Supreme Court, including by special appointment of both the Clinton and Bush Justice Departments. Rich graduated from Michigan State University's James Madison College, Oxford University in England, and the University of Chicago Law School. He clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justices Byron White and Anthony Kennedy. He lives in Grove City, Ohio with his wife Peggy, a law professor at Capital University Law School, and twin children Danny and Holly.

Over the last two decades, as the Supreme Court has sharply cut back its case load, the Solicitor General has wielded the tremendous influence that comes with being the Court's most frequent and successful litigant in new ways. In this Article, the authors examine both the causes and consequences of these changes, which have diminished the Solicitor General's role at the certiorari stage and expanded it at the merits stage. They find that at the certiorari stage, when the Court is selecting its cases and setting its agenda, the Solicitor General is now seeking certiorari in so few cases—just fifteen per Term—that the Solicitor General is ceding the federal government's once-substantial influence over the Court's agenda-setting to more aggressive litigants. At the merits stage, in contrast, the Solicitor General is now participating in over three-quarters of the Court's cases, and is doing so more frequently as amicus curiae than as a party. The authors address concerns that, with this nearly pervasive involvement, the Solicitor General may have become too intrusive in private litigation or too partisan in cases presenting high-profile, socially controversial issues. They find, however, that solicitors general have acted within their proper constitutional role, largely confining involvement as amicus to cases that directly and substantially affect the federal government's institutional interests.