Suchergebnisse

Socrates was not only a paradigmatic philosopher; he was also a paradigmatic citizen according to some contemporary political theorists—paradigmatic for his moral integrity and his political practices of dissent and noncompliance. What is perhaps most exemplary about Socrates, according to some commentators, is that his citizenship was "purely secular," relying upon no sources of authority beyond the naked moral self. The present article challenges this dominant view of Socratic citizenship by examining Socrates′ relationship to the oracle at Delphi and the mysterious divine sign that frequently turned him away from certain civic activities. Arguing that these sources of authority affected Socrates′ practice of citizenship in significant ways, the essay presents a picture of Socrates that is at once truer to the texts to which these secular views appeal and more instructive for contemporary theorizing about citizenship.

The article examines Voegelin's understanding ofnousas the ground for theorizing, and relates this back to Aristotle. Aristotle is shown to have understood the activities ofnousin two distinct ways. On the one hand,nousis the divine activity of the soul exploring its own ground. Butnousis also induction (epagôgê) of the first principles of science through sense perception, memory and experience. The two basic activities ofnousare related, but they have different values when it comes to the world of particulars. The argument is that a substantive ethical and political science—one that sheds light on particulars—must include the inductive employment ofnousand that the exclusion of this from Voegelin's political science results in some discernible limitations.The limitations of Eric Voegelin—s work are sometimes difficult to keep in view, particularly while he is expounding upon the totality of Being, the myriad dimensions of human consciousness, and the nature of order in personal, social, and historical existence. But in fact Voegelin's work is more limited than his magisterial tone might suggest. The argument of this article is that while Voegelin offers his readers profoundly important insights into the structure of human consciousness and into what Aristotle called first philosophy, the study of beingquabeing, he does not offer his readers much in the way of a substantive ethical or political science.

Politicians, pundits, and scholars have cited the principles of "just war" to defend military actions from Iraq to Afghanistan to Libya. Other politicians, pundits, and scholars have cited just war principles to condemn those same military interventions. How can the same tradition lead to such sharply opposing conclusions? What is the just war tradition, and why is it important today? Authors David D. Corey and J. Daryl Charles answer those questions in this insightful exploration. A fascinating blend of history, theology, and political philosophy, The Just War Tradition: An Introduction traces the development of the tradition from its inception nearly two millennia ago. Corey and Charles illuminate how the various voices within the tradition-from Augustine and Aquinas, to Luther and Calvin, to Suárez and Locke, up to present-day commentators-relate to one another and to rival ways of understanding war and peace