Relativism and Human Rights: A Theory of Pluralist Universalism
In: Springer eBook Collection
Preface second edition -- Introduction second edition -- Part I -- 1 Cognitive Relativism and Experiential Rationality -- 1.1 Beyond Cognitive and Linguistic Relativism -- 1.2 Epistemic Relativism Refuted -- 1.3 The Experiential Validity of the Cognitive System -- 1.3.1 Judgement and Truth -- 2 Beyond Moral Relativism and Objectivism -- 2.1 Forms of Moral Relativism -- 2.2 The Two Horns of the Dilemma: Relativism versus Objectivism -- 2.2.1 Harman's Inner-Judgments Relativism -- 2.2.2 The Limits of Nagel's Objectivism in Morality -- 2.3 Wong's Mixed Position: the Idea of Pluralistic Relativism -- 2.4 Discursive Dialectic of Recognition -- Part II -- 3 Human Rights and Pluralisitc Universalism -- 3.1 From Purposive Action to Communicative Action -- 3.1.1 Discursive dialectics and the processes of subjectivization -- 3.2 The Priority of Recognition and the Formal System of Basic Liberties -- 3.3 Human Dignity as an orienting principle of the universal system of human rights -- 3.3.1 Human Dignity as a Juridical Principle -- 3.3 The Exemplar Validity of Human Rights -- 3.4 Deliberative Constraints and Pluralistic Universalism -- 4 The Legal Dimensions of Human Rights -- 4.1 The Source and the Content Validity of Law -- 4.2 The Structure and Function of Human Rights -- 4.3 Transplantability and Legal Commensurability -- 4.4 What is Wrong in the Democratic Peace Theory -- Bibliography -- Index of names -- Index of topics.