Suchergebnisse

Résumé On démontre empiriquement que les ressources naturelles ne sont pas un facteur de dé térioration systématique de la qualité institutionnelle d'un pays. Les régimes parlementaires ne connaissent aucun effet de la rente, tirée des ressources naturelles, sur leurs institutions. En revanche, les systèmes présidentiels sont soumis à un effet non linéaire (courbe en U in versé) des ressources naturelles sur les institutions. Pour de faibles montants de ressources naturelles, les institutions fournissent suffisamment d'incitations pour éviter la mise en place d'institutions de mauvaise qualité tournées vers l'extration de la rente. En revanche, si les institutions ne fournissent pas des incitations suffisantes, on observe alors une détérioration de la qualité institutionnelle. Cet effet n'apparaît que dans les régimes présidentiels. Si l'on ré d uit l'échantillon aux pays démocratiques, les résultats sont identiques.

Dans cet article, nous proposons un panorama de la recherche académique qui s'intéresse aux causes des guerres civiles. Nous considérons tout particuliérement les conditions économiques et les facteurs naturels comme déterminants importants des guerre civiles. Les études les plus récentes (analyses quasi-expérimentales) s'intéressent à l'effet de la richesse économique, des prix des matières premières et du climat sur le risque de conflit civil. En préambule, afin d'illustrer théoriquement les résultats empiriques, nous présentons une revue de la littérature d'articles théoriques qui nous permettent de d'aborder deux explication majeures ; l'effet sur la « capacité » et le coût « d'opportunité individuel de s'engager dans un conflit armé ». Nous proposons aussi des implications politiques pour la prévention des conflits civils.

This paper uses detailed information on the latitude and longitude of conflict events within a set of Sub-Saharan African countries to study the impact of external income shocks on the likelihood of violence. We consider a number of external demand shocks faced by the country or the regions within countries - changes in the world demand of agricultural commodities, financial crises in the partner countries or changes in foreign trade policy - and combine these with information reflecting the natural level of trade openness of the location. We find that (i) within-country, the incidence, intensity and onset of conflicts are generally negatively and significantly correlated with income shocks within locations; (ii) this relationship is significantly weaker for the most remote locations, i.e those located away from the main seaports, (iii) at country-level, we cannot detect any significant effect of these shock on conflict incidence or onset; but (iv) large and longlasting shocks seem to affect the location of conflict outbreaks. In general, our results suggest that external income shocks are important determinants of the intensity and geography of conflicts within countries. However, conflicts tend to start in remote locations which are naturally less affected by foreign shocks, which might explain why these seem to have little effect on conflict onset at the country-level.

This paper looks at whether diplomatic intervention in civil war has affected trade over the post World War II period. We show that the intervener derives no commercial advantage from diplomatic intervention ; trade between the intervener and the target country does not increase more than trade between the target country and its other partners. However, we find that diplomatic intervention has a positive and persistent effect on trade between the target country and all its partners.

This paper looks at whether diplomatic intervention in civil war has affected trade over the post World War II period. We show that the intervener derives no commercial advantage from diplomatic intervention ; trade between the intervener and the target country does not increase more than trade between the target country and its other partners. However, we find that diplomatic intervention has a positive and persistent effect on trade between the target country and all its partners.

This paper looks at whether diplomatic intervention in civil war has affected trade over the post World War II period. We show that the intervener derives no commercial advantage from diplomatic intervention ; trade between the intervener and the target country does not increase more than trade between the target country and its other partners. However, we find that diplomatic intervention has a positive and persistent effect on trade between the target country and all its partners.

This paper looks at whether diplomatic intervention in civil war has affected trade over the post World War II period. We show that the intervener derives no commercial advantage from diplomatic intervention ; trade between the intervener and the target country does not increase more than trade between the target country and its other partners. However, we find that diplomatic intervention has a positive and persistent effect on trade between the target country and all its partners.

This paper looks at whether diplomatic intervention in civil war has affected trade over the post World War II period. We show that the intervener derives no commercial advantage from diplomatic intervention ; trade between the intervener and the target country does not increase more than trade between the target country and its other partners. However, we find that diplomatic intervention has a positive and persistent effect on trade between the target country and all its partners.

Using mineral resources discoveries in the United States since 1800, we argue that mineral mining fosters individualism. Measuring individualism and the demand for redistribution by questions of the General Social Survey (GSS), we show that: (i) individuals living in states with mineral resources are more individualistic and support less redistribution by the government ; (ii) the higher the number of mines in a states, the lower the support for governmental redistribution and the higher the individualism ; (iii) individuals that experienced mineral discoveries during their early adulthood are more individualistic and support less redistribution ; (iv) this effect vanishes over time. These results are robust to the introduction of various explanatory variables that may explain the formation of individualistic values. ; En utilisant les découvertes de ressources minérales aux Etats-Unis depuis 1800, nous montrons que l'abondance de ressources minérales favorise l'individualisme. Plus précisément, en utilisant des questions du General Social Survey (GSS) pour mesurer l'individualisme et la demande de redistribution, nous montrons que : (i) les individus vivant dans des états dotés de ressources minérales sont plus individualistes et demandent moins de redistribution de la part du gouvernement ; (ii) plus les mines sont nombreuses dans un état, plus cet effet est fort ; (iii) les individus qui ont assisté à la découverte de ressources minérales dans leur jeunesse sont plus individualistes et demandent moins de redistribution ; (iv) cet effet s'estompe lentement au cours du temps. Ces résultats sont robustes à l'introduction de nombreuses variables qui sont susceptibles d'expliquer la formation et valeurs individualistes.