Suchergebnisse

Presidents use the perquisites of their office to build support and goodwill among members of Congress, which they then use to increase support for their legislative agendas. Among those perquisites is the ability to invite members to social functions at the White House. This article determines what types of members received invitations between 1961 and 1967 in order to discern the strategies guiding their distribution. It then assesses their impact on the subsequent support provided by those recipients. The findings concerning the distribution of invitations show that presidents Kennedy and Johnson allocated invitations according to a "reward strong supporters" strategy: A president's favors go to his strongest supporters. They also show that party and committee leaders benefit more than rank-and-file members. The most surprising finding is that a member's party makes little difference. These findings indicate the presidents Kennedy and Johnson adhered to a fairly conservative approach to building coalitions, preferring to reward known supporters rather than to try to entice additional support from more marginal sources. The findings concerning the effects of receiving invitations indicate that southern Democratic support was increased, while support from northern Democrats and Republicans was not. The findings also demonstrate the value of complementing, when possible, knowledge about the presidency obtained from more traditional sources of information with knowledge derived from the systematic analysis of aggregate data.

Compares presidential support scores compiled by the Office of Congressional Relations, 1961-67 with similar scores compiled by Congressional Quarterly.

This article models how organizational memory develops and applies that model to three presidential agencies. Such memory is information generated within an organization, providing a sense of identity and an ability to learn. It enables staff agencies to ground information and advice to the president in sound historical knowledge. Presidential demands and extrapresidential responsibilities influence six organizational features, which in turn affect how memory develops. Usually, presidential requirements disrupt memory, and extrapresidential demands facilitate it. Data from staff interviews allow application of the model to staff components of the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Council on Environmental Quality. As expected, OMB receives the most extrapresidential pressures and the fewest presidential demands, and its organizational features help memory to develop. NSC depends on the president alone, and its features deter memory development. CEQ receives few external demands from any source, and its features mildly support some types of memories. Hence OMB has the most extensive memory, strongest learning capability, and clearest identity; NSC has the least memory, learning capacity, and sense of identity; and the CEQ's memory results in strong identity but weak learning.