Are longer bankruptcies really more costly?
In: Finance and economics discussion series 2006-27
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In: Finance and economics discussion series 2006-27
In: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/coo.31924099370581
"We find that the risk-sensitivity of bank holding company subordinated debt spreads at issuance increased with regulatory reforms that were designed to reduce conjectural government guarantees, but declined somewhat with subsequent reforms that were aimed in part at reducing regulatory forbearance. In addition, we test and find evidence for a straightforward form of "market discipline:" The extent to which bond issuance penalizes relatively risky banks. Evidence for such discipline only appears in the periods after conjectural government guarantees were reduced"--Abstract. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; "We find that the risk-sensitivity of bank holding company subordinated debt spreads at issuance increased with regulatory reforms that were designed to reduce conjectural government guarantees, but declined somewhat with subsequent reforms that were aimed in part at reducing regulatory forbearance. In addition, we test and find evidence for a straightforward form of "market discipline:" The extent to which bond issuance penalizes relatively risky banks. Evidence for such discipline only appears in the periods after conjectural government guarantees were reduced"--Abstract. ; Mode of access: Internet.
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In: FEDS Notes No. 2014-08-04 https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.0026
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Working paper
In: FEDS Working Paper No. 2011-16
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Working paper