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Abstract In this article, an investigator who is outside of the connectionist / dynamic systems (CD) tradition, but is sympathetic to many of its theoretical stances, considers whether these are separate approaches and what the two approaches mean for the development of information processing. It is argued that these approaches have not been defined in the target articles of this special issue narrowly enough to make them clearly separate approaches. Rather, they appear to emphasize different aspects of a common approach. It is also suggested that they do not form an overarching theory of development but do form an important theoretical approach at one level of analysis. In particular, one may sometimes, but not always, have to get into nonlinear interactions between faculties of the mind to predict and explain behavior. Finally, an attempt is made to challenge the CD approach to become more global by confronting the issue of how attention and conscious awareness should be represented in these models, and how the development of them may occur. Evidence of changes in automatic and attention‐related parameters of processing may provide a scaffolding upon which better CD models can be constructed.

Abstract. Background: "Committed suicide" is often deemed less acceptable than alternative phrases, but such judgments vary widely across individuals. Aim: We tested whether the endorsement of statements containing "committed suicide" is greater when a suicide death is depicted as immoral. We also assessed the degree of immorality suggested by the free-standing phrases "committed suicide" and "died by suicide." Method: Undergraduate participants ( N = 154) read scenarios of a suicide depicted as immoral and one depicted more neutrally and judged the applicability of statements employing either "committed suicide" or "died by suicide" to each scenario. Participants next chose between the free-standing phrases "committed suicide" or "died by suicide" in terms of which connoted immorality and provided written justifications for their choices. Results: Participants judged "committed suicide" statements to be most applicable to the immoral-suicide scenario. A large majority of participants chose "committed suicide" over "died by suicide" as connoting immorality and participants' justifications for this choice revealed several meaningful themes. Limitations: Our manipulation of immorality employed religious overtones and our participants were undergraduate students. Conclusions: Findings contribute to the empirical basis for concerns regarding the phrase "committed suicide," with implications for stigma reduction and help-seeking.

AbstractWe investigated how visual working memory (WM) develops with age across the early elementary school period (6–7 years), early adolescence (11–13 years), and early adulthood (18–25 years). The work focuses on changes in two parameters: the number of objects retained at least in part, and the amount of feature‐detail remembered for such objects. Some evidence suggests that, while infants can remember up to three objects, much like adults, young children only remember around two objects. This curious, nonmonotonic trajectory might be explained by differences in the level of feature‐detail required for successful performance in infant versus child/adult memory paradigms. Here, we examined if changes in one of two parameters (the number of objects, and the amount of detail retained for each object) or both of them together can explain the development of visual WM ability as children grow older. To test it, we varied the amount of feature‐detail participants need to retain. In the baseline condition, participants saw an array of objects and simply were to indicate whether an object was present in a probed location or not. This phase begun with a titration procedure to adjust each individual's array size to yield about 80% correct. In other conditions, we tested memory of not only location but also additional features of the objects (color, and sometimes also orientation). Our results suggest that capacity growth across ages is expressed by both improved location‐memory (whether there was an object in a location) and feature completeness of object representations.

AbstractPresentation of two kinds of materials in working memory (visual and acoustic), with the requirement to attend to one or both modalities, poses an interesting case for working memory development because competing predictions can be formulated. In two experiments, we assessed such predictions with children 7–13 years old and adults. With development, the ability to hold more information in the focus of attention could lead to an increase in the size of the trade‐off between modalities; if attention can hold A items during unimodal‐attention trials, then on average attention should hold A/2 of those same items during bimodal‐attention trials. If A increases with age, so would the dual‐task cost, A/2. The results clearly ruled out that possibility. It was the modality‐ or code‐specific components of working memory that improved with age and not the central component. We discuss various mechanisms that could have produced these results, including alternative attention‐based mechanisms. The findings point to a rich field for continued research.

AbstractWe explored the causal role of individual and age‐related differences in working memory (WM) capacity in long‐term memory (LTM) retrieval. Our sample of 160 participants included 120 children (6–13‐years old) and 40 young adults (18–24 years). Participants performed a WM task with images of unique everyday items, presented at varying set sizes. Subsequently, we tested participants' LTM for items from the WM task. Using these measures, we estimated the ratio at which items successfully held in WM were recognized in LTM. While WM and LTM generally improved with age, the ability to transfer information from WM to LTM appeared consistent between age groups. Moreover, individual differences in WM capacity appeared to predict LTM encoding. Overall, these results suggested that LTM performance was constrained by experimental, individual, and age‐related WM limitations. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this WM‐to‐LTM bottleneck.

AbstractAccording to some views of cognitive growth, the development of working memory capacity can account for increases in the complexity of cognition. It has been difficult to ascertain, though, that there actually is developmental growth in capacity that cannot be attributed to other developing factors. Here we assess the role of item familiarity. We document developmental increases in working memory for visual arrays of English letters versus unfamiliar characters. Although letter knowledge played a special role in development between the ages of 6 and 8 years, children with adequate letter knowledge showed practically the same developmental growth in normalized functions for letters and unfamiliar characters. The results contribute to a growing body of evidence that the developmental improvement in working memory does not wholly stem from supporting processes such as encoding, mnemonic strategies, and knowledge. A video abstract is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LJdqErLR2Hs&feature=youtu.be

AbstractPrevious studies have indicated that visual working memory performance increases with age in childhood, but it is not clear why. One main hypothesis has been that younger children are less efficient in their attention; specifically, they are less able to exclude irrelevant items from working memory to make room for relevant items. We examined this hypothesis by measuring visual working memory capacity under a continuum of five attention conditions. A recognition advantage was found for items to be attended as opposed to ignored. The size of this attention‐related effect was adult‐like in young children with small arrays, suggesting that their attention processes are efficient even though their working memory capacity is smaller than that of older children and adults. With a larger working memory load, this efficiency in young children was compromised. The efficiency of attention cannot be the sole explanation for the capacity difference.