Suchergebnisse

When demand functions in different markets are derived from distributions of reservation prices that differ only in their means, conditions exist such that third‐degree price discrimination leads to greater total output and greater total welfare. Welfare is higher with discrimination than with a uniform price when demand functions are derived from logistic distributions with different means. Welfare and consumer surplus are higher with discrimination for demands derived from a distribution related to the Pareto. In general, whether discrimination increases total output depends on demand being more convex in markets in which prices fall with discrimination than in those in which prices rise.

The welfare effects of third‐degree price discrimination are analyzed when demand in one market is an additively shifted version of demand in the other market and both markets are served with uniform pricing. Social welfare is lower with discrimination if the slope of demand is log concave or the convexity of demand is nondecreasing in the price. The demand functions commonly used in models of imperfect competition satisfy at least one of these sufficient conditions.

This paper analyses the welfare effects of price‐cap regulation of a multi‐product monopolist when the price index has fixed weights. A tight cap can result in welfare below the level associated with an unregulated monopoly. This does not occur if the weights are based on lagged quantities and the level of the cap exceeds the previous period's total cost. In a two‐period model the welfare problem is alleviated in the second period but first‐period performance can be worse if the firm is not myopic.

This paper presents a general analysis of the effects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination on welfare and output when all markets are served. Sufficient conditions—involving straightforward comparisons of the curvatures of the direct and inverse demand functions in the different markets—are presented for discrimination to have negative or positive effects on social welfare and output. (JEL D42)