Suchergebnisse

During 2016, 30 individuals with a mental health condition (who claimed ESA, have had their ESA withdrawn and moved on to JSA, or have been directed into the WRAG group based on the decision of the WCA) were interviewed. The 30 participants were recruited throughout Scotland. In addition, we interviewed seven individuals who had involvement with various intermediaries, such as advocacy organisations, collective advocacy groups, Citizens Advice Bureau and (an ex employee of) Ingeus. Participants were recruited through advocacy organisations, voluntary groups and the local media. Overall, we established that the Work Capability Assessment (WCA) does not inspire confidence in participants in its adequacy for assessing mental health problems. There is concern that the assessors do not appear to have appropriate expertise in mental health. The WCA experience for many, caused a deterioration in people's mental health which individuals did not recover from. In the worst cases, the WCA experience led to thoughts of suicide. People felt that that there was an inconsistency in terms of GP recommendations and the WCA recommendations. Many people were subject to further upset and distress due to communication from the DWP being lost in the post. Having a mental health condition (MHC) in parallel with being unemployed and on benefits leads individuals to be confronted with multiple and competing stigmas, which they find hard to manage and these become self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating. The WCA and other mandatory structures, work against individuals developing or retaining employability skills as voluntary work is seen as demonstrating fitness for work; education is also not possible whilst receiving ESA. The system fails to recognise that for many, volunteering is good for wellbeing and may be 'as good as it gets'. Whilst the Scottish Government does not have control over the ESA component of Universal Credit, it needs to carefully consider how any benefits that is does have control over (e.g. DLA) are assessed and ...

Abstract
Excessive exposure to ultraviolet (UV) radiation from the sun in summer can cause skin cancer and in Britain there are around 1500 new cases of non-melanoma skin cancer (NMSC) each year, caused by exposure to solar UV at work. Little is known about the magnitude of UV exposure amongst outdoor construction workers in Britain, although this is one of the main groups at risk. The aim of this paper is to summarise measurements of erythema-weighted UVB radiation amongst construction workers in Scotland and the Southeast of England and interpret the data in terms of the risk of NMSC. The measurements were made as part of an intervention study using short mobile phone text messages to alter worker behaviour to either reduce UV exposure in summer or increase serum vitamin D in winter; the intervention is only briefly reported here. Data were collected from 67 workers from 9 worksites, of whom 41 provided measures of UV exposure for 758 working days. Daily exposure ranged from 0 to 13.47 standard erythema dose (SED), with the mean exposure for outdoor workers being 2.0 SED and the corresponding value for indoor workers being 0.7 SED. These data were obtained from a sensor located on the back of the workers hard hat; others have measured exposure on the wrist or upper arm and these locations probably, on average, have higher levels of UV exposure. It is likely that an outdoor construction worker in Britain could accumulate sufficient solar UV exposure over 30–40 years of work to more than double their risk of NMSC. We argue that employers in Britain should take a more proactive approach to manage sun safety and they should take responsibility for skin health surveillance for their workers.

AbstractSocieties worldwide are investing considerable resources into the safe development and use of nanomaterials. Although each of these protective efforts is crucial for governing the risks of nanomaterials, they are insufficient in isolation. What is missing is a more integrative governance approach that goes beyond legislation. Development of this approach must be evidence based and involve key stakeholders to ensure acceptance by end users. The challenge is to develop a framework that coordinates the variety of actors involved in nanotechnology and civil society to facilitate consideration of the complex issues that occur in this rapidly evolving research and development area. Here, we propose three sets of essential elements required to generate an effective risk governance framework for nanomaterials. (1) Advanced tools to facilitate risk‐based decision making, including an assessment of the needs of users regarding risk assessment, mitigation, and transfer. (2) An integrated model of predicted human behavior and decision making concerning nanomaterial risks. (3) Legal and other (nano‐specific and general) regulatory requirements to ensure compliance and to stimulate proactive approaches to safety. The implementation of such an approach should facilitate and motivate good practice for the various stakeholders to allow the safe and sustainable future development of nanotechnology.