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"European Democracies is an introduction to the politics and governments of Western, Central, and Eastern Europe. Organized thematically rather than country-by-country, this fully revised edition examines topics such as electoral systems, the European Union, refugees and the welfare state, and asks how to explain variations in policy outcomes, and how globalization is affecting European Democracies, among others. Throughout, the author treats Europe as a single but diverse entity and asks readers to compare what they learn about European politics with the politics of their own country. Key features in this new edition include: An updated thematic introduction to the politics and governments of Europe; Fully revised to include comprehensive coverage of recent electoral politics and political events in Europe, such as Brexit, the refugee crisis, and terrorist attacks; New chapters on immigration and the nature of European political culture and welfare state. New comparative sections covering topics such as political parties, and financial and political differences in governments between Europe and the USA."-- Provided by publisher.

A primordial challenge to the welfare state? -- The politics of resentment : xenophobia and the welfare state -- Trust in diverse societies -- Welfare state regimes as a regime for building trust? : contextualizing attitudes -- To belong or not to belong : incorporation and integration policies in modern welfare states -- The politics of immigration and the welfare state in Germany, Sweden, and the United States

ObjectiveTo explore the links between authoritarian personality traits and welfare chauvinism by controlling for a host of alternative explanations while also investigating whether these links are additive or interacting with other triggering variables.MethodUsing the online survey platform Qualtrics, a stratified sample of 1,010 respondents in Germany was recruited in January 2019. Authoritarian personality is operationalized by applying the fourfold child‐rearing scale pioneered by Feldman and Stenner.ResultsFindings indicate that authoritarianism has an independent, additive effect on welfare chauvinism, but cultural and economic threats do not systematically mediate the effect of authoritarianism on welfare chauvinism.ConclusionSubmissive authoritarianism is significantly linked to a desire to disentitle immigrants from using welfare benefits.

A specter is haunting the Trilateral Democracies—this specter is called civic malaise. It has visited these countries before; rearing its head for the first time a quarter-century ago, proclaiming the demise of democracy due to the inability of governments to respond to the onslaught of waves of new forms of participatory democracy and political action. (Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission, 1975). Too much democracy, as it were, may be too much of a good thing. Fortunately many of these dire predictions have not materialized, perhaps partly because they were highlighted a quarter-century ago. The sequel, Disaffected Democracies, celebrates the silver anniversary of the original Crisis of Democracy. This successor volume is similarly concerned with the fate of democracy in rich countries. These democracies are "troubled" (p. 7), so the argument goes, because their public institutions are undermined by declining confidence in government and sagging interpersonal social trust. The authors of this edited volume situate the sources of these "disturbing" (p.13) developments squarely in the political sphere. In other words, the origins of the decline in confidence in political institutions is not explained by a frail social fabric but, rather, by failures of government and politics themselves. Despite a tight focus on the temporal (the last 25 years) and spatial (the Trilateral countries) parameters of this edited volume, it is refreshing to see so many diverse and innovative diagnoses as to what is ailing the rich democracies.

The toughest challenges to Austrian corporatism originate in the domestic sphere as a result of an increasing chasm between societal values & the political institutions that were designed to represent these values. The modernization process moves society ever further away from the cultural & sociological pillars on which corporatism was built, leading to a situation in which the corporatist apparatus is perceived to be increasingly out of touch with the demands of the public. In addition, political changes, such as the rise of postmaterial parties, & the inclusion of hitherto anticorporatist parties into a coalition government will further reduce the influence of corporatism on policy making. However, with Austria's accession to the European Union, & globalization pressures in general, the institutional structure of corporatism & the expertise of corporatists may well become a major asset in assisting Austria as it faces pressures towards convergence. 26 References. Adapted from the source document.

Globalization is said to restrict severely the state's capacity to fulfill its welfare function in advanced industrial societies. This paper tests empirically the redistributive capacity of the state operationalized as the difference in percent of households who live below 50% of the median income in their respective country before taxes & transfers & after taxes & transfers, based on the latest Luxembourg Income Study data. Besides globalization, specific sets of domestic political institutions predictably & systematically affect the redistributive capacity of the state: what is termed "collective veto points" buoy redistribution by the state, while "competitive veto points" have the opposite effect. Partisan coloration is introduced as a control variable that, surprisingly, does not affect this critical function of the welfare state. The research design is a cross-sectionally dominant panel design (N = 15, t = 2). This study finds evidence that globalization & collective veto points both positively affect the redistributive capacity of the state while the converse is true for competitive veto points. 3 Tables, 1 Figure, 62 References. Adapted from the source document.

This article argues that consensual political institutions as operationalized by Lijphart and Crepaz (1991) have significantly favorable effects on unemployment, inflation, and the number of working days lost, whereas economic growth remains unaffected. Although this finding is consistent with Olson's theoretical concept of "encompassing organizations," this study shows that Olson's empirical operationalization is flawed. "Strong," two-party "Westminster" systems, based on single-member district electoral rules, and single-party, bare majority cabinets do not perform as well as "weak," multiparty coalition governments with proportional representation as an electoral rule. An empirical measure of "encompassing organizations" is introduced, termed popular cabinet support. A cross-sectional/time-series panel study of 162 elections (18 countries and 9 elections per country, N = 162) provides strong evidence that governments with consensual, inclusive, and accommodative constitutional structures and wider popular cabinet support behave more "responsibly" than do their more majoritarian, exclusionary, and adversarial counterparts.