Suchergebnisse

Why do some wars end with an absolute outcome, with state death or regime change? I argue that we are more likely to see absolute outcomes when we have territorial disputes with the potential for credible commitment problems and asymmetric disputants. In the absence of credible commitment problems, disputes are less likely to recur, and states are unlikely to seek to absorb the opponent state or remove its government. Among more symmetric disputants, states cannot impose an absolute outcome, and we are more likely to see recurrent disputes in the face of credible commitment problems. Only in very asymmetric dyads are we likely to have both the required willingness and opportunity to impose absolute outcomes to attempt to solve a credible commitment problem over territorial conflict.

What accounts for the growth of naval power in Asia, and are we witnessing a new naval arms race? Through a unique quantitative assessment of naval development in Asia, I show that economic and geostrategic factors are driving naval development in the region. Additionally, I examine the growth of naval might in China, Japan, India, and South Korea, and find evidence of a potential naval arms race in Asia. The article's findings point to the importance of testing for regional variation in naval development and using specific weapons systems to test for evidence of an arms race.

Studies of power parity and conflict implicitly assume all balanced dyads are created equal. However, variation exists within the capabilities of the states in these particular dyads. I address the question of what affects the likelihood of conflict onset within relatively balanced dyads. I argue uncertainty-in particular the uncertainty of the expected costs of conflict-determines the likelihood of conflict among these dyads. More uncertainty of costs means a greater likelihood of miscalculation leading to bargaining errors. First, I argue as an opponent's capabilities increase, uncertainty of costs increase and the likelihood of conflict increases. Second, military action serves a purpose in bargaining and can help reduce uncertainty by signaling a state's willingness to inflict and endure costs in order to gain a better settlement. Third, information transmission is likely to be effective only when states have the capability to inflict significant costs. As such, while greater capabilities will lead to a high likelihood of conflict onset, they also lead to a reduced likelihood of conflict escalation. The testing of nondirected dyads from 1946 to 2001 supports the theory's implications. ( International Interactions (London)/ FUB)

Naval power is a crucial element of state power, yet existing naval data sets are limited to a small number of states and ship types. Here we present 147 years of naval data on all the world's navies from 1865 to 2011. This country-year data set focuses on warships with ship-based weapons capable of using kinetic force to inflict damage on other structures or peoples. After identifying a country's active naval forces, we create a measure of naval power based on the aggregate tonnage of the active ships. Additionally, we create count variables for ship types such as aircraft carriers or battleships. This article introduces the country-year data, describes variables of interests for use in country-year, dyadic, or systemic studies, and suggests potential questions of interest scholars could explore using the naval power data set. (International Interactions (London)/ FUB)