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This article examines the changing patterns in Türkiye's strategic and military posture since the establishment of the Republic, with a focus on the developments, and changes, since the 1980s. Originally based on the two principles of deterrence and collective security, this view has later developed in other directions. In the 1980s, this posture started to shift as Türkiye became a more assertive regional player, and the domestic civilian–military balances were changing. This evolution would emerge more visibly under the AKP, as a new perception of the Turkish geographical centrality brought the country to play a pro-active regional and international role, exemplified by the emergence of Türkiye as a peacekeeping actor with an aggressive economic foreign policy. In this period, the Turkish strategic view evolved, making active engagement and forward defense two pillars of a new approach.

28 November 2020 marked 25 years since the European Union (EU) launched the so-called Barcelona Process. What was known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is, to date, the most ambitious attempt launched by the EU to cope with the challenges emanating from its Southern neighbourhood. This article aims to shed light on the Mediterranean dynamics at play in the years before the formal launch of the EMP, and consider them the crucial drivers in pushing the EC/EU to promote a more comprehensive approach to the Mediterranean. Developments in Europe, notably the German reunification, clearly played a significant role in pushing countries such as Spain, France and Italy to promote a more significant European role in the Mediterranean to partially rebalance the impact of a united Germany. However, in this work, it is argued that security problems arising from the Maghreb and a number of structural changes in the Arab Israeli confrontation created the actual momentum for the establishment of the EMP. The primary focus is thus on those regional dynamics that pushed the EU to adopt a new and more comprehensive Mediterranean policy, at least in its intentions.

On 31 January 2020, the United Kingdom officially withdrew from the European Union (EU). Brexit will reduce the EU global outreach in specific areas in which the role of the UK was essential. The Gulf is one of them. Brexit is also happening as the era of the Anglosaxon hegemony in the Gulf is coming to an end. What here is defined as the active Gulf has replaced the passive Gulf, a process that has been in the making for a while. This means that a geopolitical vacuum that needs to be filled – either by regional or external actors – is emerging. As no external actor can play in the Gulf the role played by the UK and the US in the past; mounting security dilemmas are affecting more and more the views and perceptions of regional actors. This article aims at analysing these dynamics in the light of Brexit and how these two dynamics can impact the EU-GCC historically dysfunctional liaison. In order to do so, the paper will use the lens and language of geopolitics. The post-Brexit EU, thus, will have to interact with the Active Gulf. The EU will fail to provide an alternative to the US as a potential external security provider, and the absence of the UK from the EU ranks will also preclude the EU from having a crucial driver to deepen these relations further.
EU, GCC, Gulf, UK, Brexit, US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, Geopolitics

As Tunisia continues to move forward on the path of democratisation and pluralism, the problems it may still face remain significant. A comparative analysis of the (failed) Algerian attempt to democratise and the current process underway in Tunisia could shed light on what Tunisia needs to do to avoid a setback in its democratisation process.