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Not since the 1960s have U.S. politicians, Republican or Democrat, campaigned on platforms defending big government, much less the use of regulation to help solve social ills. And since the late 1970s, "deregulation" has become perhaps the most ubiquitous political catchword of all. This book takes on the critics of government regulation. Providing the first major alternative to conventional arguments grounded in public choice theory, it demonstrates that regulatory government can, and on important occasions does, advance general interests. Unlike previous accounts, Regulation and Public Inter

By exploring the consequences of imperfect information, R. Douglas Arnold and John Mark Hansen (both intellectual descendants of David Mayhew) make significant contributions to the rational-choice theory of legislator decision-making. Indeed, their books can be usefully understood as the latest stage in the evolution of that theory. Ultimately, however, their contributions to the theory are incomplete. While Arnold and Hansen both highlight an insufficiently emphasized issue, their particular arguments concerning the implications of imperfect information leave unanswered several important questions.

Increasing international economic interdependence is obviously becoming a growing challenge to governments, which are frustrated by their limited capacities to regulate or control cross-border economic activities. Many subjects trigger this frustration, including interest rates, various fraudulent or criminal activities, product standards, consumer protection, environmental issues and prudential concerns for financial services. Although it has been said that "all politics is local," it has also been said, with considerable justification, that "all economics is international."