Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
Alternativ können Sie versuchen, selbst über Ihren lokalen Bibliothekskatalog auf das gewünschte Dokument zuzugreifen.
Bei Zugriffsproblemen kontaktieren Sie uns gern.
33 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Journal of monetary economics, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 226-232
In: IMF Working Papers, S. 1-43
SSRN
In: IMF Working Paper No. 09/57
SSRN
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 748-762
In: European journal of political economy, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 748-762
ISSN: 1873-5703
A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. The model also explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. The data confirm this. [Copyright 2008 Elsevier B.V.]
In: IMF Working Paper No. 06/289
SSRN
SSRN
In: IMF Working Papers, S. 1-41
SSRN
In: IMF Working Papers
In: IMF working paper WP/09/57
The recent housing bust has reignited interest in psychological theories of speculative excess (Shiller, 2007). I investigate this issue by identifying a segment of the U.S. population-evangelical protestants-that may be less prone to speculative motives, and uncover a significant negative relationship between their population share and house price volatility. Evangelicals' focus on Biblical prophecy could account for this difference, since it may enable them to interpret otherwise negative events as containing positive news, dampening the response of house prices to shocks. I provide evidence
In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Band 60, Heft 8, S. 950-966
In: IMF Working Papers, S. 1-65
SSRN
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 763-777
In: European journal of political economy, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 763-777
ISSN: 1873-5703
Over the past two decades, the pace of central bank reforms in terms of institutional independence and transparency has been particularly brisk. This paper examines the current level of central bank independence (CBI) and transparency in a broad sample of countries using newly constructed measures, and looks at the evolution in both measures from an earlier time period. The legal independence of central banks has increased markedly since the 1980s, while the rise in transparency since the late 1990s has been less impressive. Exploiting the time dimension of our data to eliminate country fixed effects and using instrumental variable estimation to overcome endogeneity concerns, we present robust evidence that greater CBI is associated with lower inflation. We also find that enhanced transparency practices are associated with the private sector making greater use of information provided by the central bank. [Copyright 2008 Elsevier B.V.]
In: IMF Working Papers, S. 1-28
SSRN