Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis article assesses Moldova's political evolution during its first 25 years of independence. It argues that while the country has gone through 3 very distinct periods of governance during that time, the underlying conditions that have hobbled efforts to establish a stable democratic regime remained consistent. These included the country's precarious location in the international system, weak institutions and the rule of law, and a deep cleavage regarding national identity. Consequently, the country settled into a pattern of systemic corruption and, at best, a deeply flawed form of democracy. By the end of this period, Moldovans faced the task of mounting a renewed effort to regain control over their political institutions.

Over the course of the past ten years the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for national Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) has progressively extended its control over Macedonian political, social, and economic life, restricting the space for democratic discourse and limiting completion. Throughout this period it has acted in concert with elites representing the country's Albanian minority and has included Albanian political parties, currently the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) as minority coalition partners. This article will examine the conditions that gave rise to illiberalism in Macedonia and the interaction between ethnic politics and the retreat from democracy.

Romania is an archetypical case of protracted post-communism. Its regime transition was problematic and its founding election flawed, allowing successor communists to secure their hold on power. A period of quasi-authoritarianism and failed reform followed until critical elections in 1996 brought the liberal opposition to power for the first time. Since that time its political system has stabilized into a pattern in which electoral competition occurs but political accountability is limited and corruption is widespread. The current regime should therefore be considered as consolidated, bearing the marks of the transition period, but unlikely to undergo any further near term dramatic change.

During the late 1980s the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldavia, like many other regions within the former USSR, entered into a period of political turmoil. As the grip of the Communist Party weakened, increasingly serious conflict broke out between the Romanian-speaking majority and minority activists. Separatist forces quickly established themselves in two of the republic's regions, Transnistria on the east bank of the Dnestr river and the Gagauz districts in the south. Both claimed sovereignty and forcibly resisted the authority of the central government. By 1992 severe fighting was underway, especially in Transnistria, and Moldova appeared to be on the verge of a spiral into unrestrained civil conflict. Yet, by 1995, nationalist forces in Moldova had declined, and one of the two separatist conflicts, that in the Gagauz region, had been resolved by the peaceful reintegration of the Gagauz into Moldova. The second conflict, in Transnistria, was at least partially defused, and escalation was avoided.

This article discusses the relationship between the Romanian armed forces and the leadership of the Romanian Communist party. It suggests that this relationship has been complicated, and made more difficult, by Romania's pursuit of foreign policy autonomy from the Soviet Union. Ceausescu has relied more on direct political intervention and less on positive inducements to retain control of the armed forces than have his counterparts elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Romania's defense establishment, like other institutions in that country, has been reduced to a state of stagnation and cannot under present circumstances be expected to provide the basis for leadership alternative to that of the current Communist party elite.