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The social networks of voters have been shown to facilitate political cooperation and information transmission in established democracies. These same social networks, however, can also make it easier for politicians in new democracies to engage in clientelistic electoral strategies. Using survey data from the Philippines, this article demonstrates that individuals with more friend and family ties are disproportionately targeted for vote buying. This is consistent with the importance of other social factors identified in the literature such as reciprocity, direct ties to politicians, and individual social influence. In addition, this article presents evidence supporting an additional mechanism linking voter social networks to the targeting of vote buying: social network–based monitoring. Voters with larger networks are both more sensitive to the ramifications of reneging on vote buying agreements and are primarily targeted for vote buying in contexts where monitoring is necessary.

Elections in consolidating democracies are often undermined by illegal electoral strategies such as vote buying and electoral violence. Previous research has focused on the mechanisms of political exchange and the systemic factors that contribute to vote buying or violence. By contrast, this dissertation addresses the broader questions of how politicians choose among different electoral strategies, how they target voters, and the implications for accountability and economic development. Among politicians, the structure of their social networks affects their choice of electoral strategy. In particular, vertical connections among politicians (such as ties among governors, mayors, and congressmen) facilitates individually targeted policies because the overlapping constituencies encourages collusion to target the same voters. By contrast, horizontal connections among politicians (such as ties among mayors of different towns) promote cooperation and information sharing, making group-targeted strategies such as pork barrel funding more attractive. Among voters, their position within village social networks determine whether they are targeted for illegal electoral strategies. Individuals with more social ties are disproportionately targeted for vote buying, while individuals with politically-relevant ties are targeted for electoral violence and intimidation. Understanding the politician and voter social network determinants of illegal electoral strategies is important for the design of policy initiatives to promote accountability and development-friendly electoral strategies

The challenge of public administration reform is well known: Politicians often have little interest in the efficient implementation of government policy. Using new data from 439 World Bank public sector reform loans in 109 countries, we demonstrate that such reforms are significantly less likely to succeed in the presence of non-programmatic political parties. Earlier research uses evidence from a small group of countries to conclude that clientelist politicians resist reforms that restrict their patronage powers. We support this conclusion with new evidence from many countries, allowing us to rule out alternative explanations, including the effect of electoral and political institutions. We also examine reforms that have not been the subject of prior research: those that make public sector financial management more transparent. Here, we identify a second mechanism through which non-programmatic parties undermine public sector reform: Clientelist politicians have weaker incentives to exercise oversight of policy implementation by the executive branch.

The challenge of public administration reform is well-known: politicians often have little interest in the efficient implementation of government policy. Using new data from 439 World Bank public sector reform loans in 109 countries, we demonstrate that such reforms are significantly less likely to succeed in the presence of non-programmatic political parties. Earlier research uses evidence from a small group of countries to conclude that clientelistic politicians resist reforms that restrict their patronage powers. We support this conclusion with new evidence from many countries, allowing us to rule out alternative explanations, including the effect of electoral and political institutions. We also examine reforms that have not been the subject of prior research: those that make public sector financial management more transparent. Here, we identify a second mechanism through which non-programmatic parties undermine public sector reform: clientelistic politicians have weaker incentives to exercise oversight of policy implementation by the executive branch.

AbstractPoliticians in developing countries misuse foreign aid to get reelected by fiscally manipulating foreign aid resources or domestic budgets. Our article suggests another mechanism that does not require politicians to have any control over foreign aid in order to make use of it for electoral purposes: undeserved credit claiming. We analyze the conditions under which local politicians can undeservedly take credit for the receipt of foreign aid and thereby boost their chances of reelection. We theorize that politicians can employ a variety of techniques to claim credit for development aid even when they have little or no influence on its actual allocation. Using a subnational World Bank development program in the Philippines, we demonstrate that credit claiming is an important strategy to exploit foreign aid inflows and that the political effects of aid can persist even when projects are designed to minimize the diversion or misuse of funds.

AbstractDespite the prominence of information in theories of electoral accountability, providing voters with information often fails to improve politician performance. Using two experiments in the Philippines, we show that when voters are unfamiliar with basic government capabilities, merely informing them of what politicians could do is sufficient to decrease support for incumbents. However, politicians can counteract this decrease in support by increasing clientelistic practices such as vote buying. Our work shows how even neutral information campaigns can improve the leverage of voters vis-à-vis their politicians, offering guidance for the design of interventions to change the electoral equilibrium in clientelistic countries.