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Contents -- Author Bios -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 National Rights to Self-Determination -- 1.2 Humanitarian Duties to Include -- 1.3 Organization and Content of This Volume -- 1.3.1 What Is a Citizen? -- 1.3.2 Rights of Citizenship -- 1.3.3 Moral Duties to Immigrants -- 1.3.4 Ethics of Exclusion -- 1.3.5 Asylum Seekers and Refugees -- Reference -- Part I: Conceptions of Citizenship -- Chapter 2: National Citizenship and Civil Marriage: Ascriptive and Consensual Models -- 2.1 Ascriptive and Consensual Citizenship -- 2.2 Marriage as an Instrument of Self-Definition and Self-Rule

This text presents an integrated theory of social oppression which tackles the fundamental question: if there is no natural hierarchy among humans, why are some cases of oppression so persistent? It argues that the explanation lies in the coercive co-opting of the oppressed to join in their own oppression

Abstract:This essay explores the concept of the connected self-owner, which takes account of the metaphysical significance of relations among persons for persons' capacities to be owners. This concept of the self-owner conflicts with the traditional libertarian understanding of the self-owner as atomistic or essentially separable from all others. I argue that the atomistic self cannot be a self-owner. A self-owner is a moral person with intentions, desires, and thoughts. But in order to have intentions, desires, and thoughts a being must relate to others through language and norm-guided behavior. Individual beings require the pre-existence of norms and norm-givers to bootstrap their selves, and norms, norm-givers, and norm-takers are necessary to continue to support the self. That means, I argue, that the self who can be an owner is essentially connected. Next, I ask how humans become connected selves and whether that connection matters morally. I distinguish among those connections that support development of valuable capacities. One such capacity is the autonomous individual. I argue that the social connections that allow the development of autonomous individuals have moral value and should be fostered. On the basis of these two values, I argue that we can support at least two nonvoluntary obligations, one negative and one positive, that we can ground in our metaphysical essence as connected self-owners.

This is the author's accepted manuscript.The original publication is available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17449626.2013.849288#.VD7cERYXNWs. ; In international law, 'humanitarian intervention' refers to the use of military force by one nation or group of nations to stop genocide or other gross human rights violations in another sovereign nation. If humanitarian intervention is conceived as military in nature, it makes sense that only the most horrible, massive, and violent violations of human rights can justify intervention. Yet, that leaves many serious evils beyond the scope of legal intervention. In particular, violations of women's rights and freedoms often go unchecked. To address this problem, I begin from two basic questions: When are violations of human rights sufficiently serious to require an international response of some sort? What should that response be? By re-orienting the aim and justification of international law to focus on individual autonomy rather than on peace between nations, I argue that women's rights violations other than genocide and mass rape can warrant intervention. Military intervention is often counter-productive to the aim of achieving autonomy, however. I suggest a range of responses to human rights violations that includes military intervention as one end of the spectrum, and combine this with a greater understanding of the scope of human rights violations that require international response.

This article discusses explanatory theories of normative concepts and argues for a set of criteria of adequacy by which such theories may be evaluated. The criteria offered fall into four categories: ontological, theoretical, pragmatic, and moral. After defending the criteria and discussing their relative weighting, this article uses them to prune the set of available explanatory theories of oppression. Functionalist theories, including Hegelian recognition theory and Foucauldian social theory, are rejected, as are psychoanalytic theory and social dominance theory. Finally, the article defends structural rational choice theory as the most promising methodology for explaining oppression.