Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the U.S. Department of Justice offers binding legal advice to the executive branch, including the president. Its advice touches most aspects of law, but it is especially influential for its interpretation of constitutional provisions that rarely, if ever, are subject to judicial scrutiny. While its importance is acknowledged by journalists, law professors, and legal practitioners, political science has yet to incorporate OLC systematically into studies of the presidency outside the ambit of war and emergency powers—areas where OLC achieved notoriety during the George W. Bush administration. We argue that there are unique and important reasons for political scientists to study OLC beyond its War on Terror legacy. In this essay, we construct a theory‐driven research agenda for incorporating OLC into studies of the rhetorical and administrative presidencies, Neustadtian bargaining and the unilateral presidency, and transformative bureaucracy.