Suchergebnisse

AbstractInterest groups and policy advocates often view the initiative process as a way to circumvent a gridlocked state legislative process. A major assumption behind this strategy is that this alternative path can be successful. We theorize that the same conflict and lack of consensus that killed the legislation in the legislative process may resurface in the electorate and jeopardize the measure's chances of success at the ballot box. We test this proposition on all initiatives in California from 1912 to 2020 and on a smaller subset of the data that controls for campaign spending and the economy. We find clear and consistent evidence that voter support for initiatives, especially fiscal initiatives, declines under periods of divided government. In addition, interactive models show that increasing levels of party polarization exacerbate these effects. We conclude by discussing the implications of these results for the debate about whether the initiative process makes states more responsive to constituent opinion.

Although California often receives national attention for its budgeting at the ballot box, virtually all states engage in some level of it because bonds and constitutional amendments involving fiscal matters require voter approval. These decisions can constrain the discretion of policy makers, often making it harder to adopt annual budgets. Despite these consequences, little scholarly attention has been paid to this phenomenon. This article investigates the factors that lead to initiative use on budgetary matters. Specifically, data on California initiatives that earmark revenue or cut taxes from 1948 to 2004 are used to estimate count models. The results show that divided government and party polarization are central factors in determining the number of initiatives on the ballot, but they have divergent effects on earmarks and tax cuts. These factors increase initiative earmarks, while they reduce tax-cut initiatives. Budget conditions also play a significant role in the frequency of these measures.

Advocates of term limits argued that term limits would help reduce out-of-control government spending by removing veteran legislators who became acclimated to the prospending environment in our nation's capitals. However, previous research shows that term limits may increase spending, which could jeopardize state fiscal health. The primary purpose of this article is to examine whether states with term limits encounter more fiscal problems than non-term-limited states. I suggest that the short-term fiscal outlooks and loss of experienced legislators produced by term-limit turnover lead to poor fiscal conditions. Myopic legislators may avoid tough fiscal decisions, while inexperienced legislators may be ill-equipped to develop sound fiscal policy. Analysis of budget data on U.S. states from 1983 to 2008 reveals that legislative turnover decreases budget balances. Results further show that these effects do not appear in the upper chamber, perhaps because state senates have more experienced legislators than the lower chamber. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

Advocates of term limits argued that term limits would help reduce out-of-control government spending by removing veteran legislators who became acclimated to the prospending environment in our nation's capitals. However, previous research shows that term limits may increase spending, which could jeopardize state fiscal health. The primary purpose of this article is to examine whether states with term limits encounter more fiscal problems than non-term-limited states. I suggest that the short-term fiscal outlooks and loss of experienced legislators produced by term-limit turnover lead to poor fiscal conditions. Myopic legislators may avoid tough fiscal decisions, while inexperienced legislators may be ill-equipped to develop sound fiscal policy. Analysis of budget data on U.S. states from 1983 to 2008 reveals that legislative turnover decreases budget balances. Results further show that these effects do not appear in the upper chamber, perhaps because state senates have more experienced legislators than the lower chamber.

AbstractCalifornia is notorious for its budget gridlock. From 1950 to 2008, the budget was adopted late 44% of the time. Although short delays have few consequences, delays in passage have become longer in the last two decades, leading to more severe consequences, such as a lower credit rating and higher borrowing costs. The purpose of this article is to systematically analyze late adoptions of the state budget. I examine annual data from 1901 to 2008 and conduct regression analysis of the length of budget delays, controlling for economic conditions. This study reveals that political and economic conditions, tax policy, and voter-passed initiatives all prolong delays. Interestingly, election years do not reduce budget gridlock despite the potential electoral pressure on the governor and legislature to reach a compromise. I conclude by discussing the study's implications for investigations of budget gridlock in other states and at the national level.

Objectives. One of the major policy concerns at the federal and state level is the rising number of individuals without health insurance. The purpose of this article is to investigate whether party control of government and various state reforms impact the percentage of the state population without health insurance.Methods. Using data from 1987–2007, I empirically examine whether party control and five state policy reforms reduce the uninsured population.Results. The results show that Republicans are more effective than Democrats at the state level at reducing insurance gaps and that three of five policy reforms explored appear to significantly expand insurance coverage.Conclusions. The results provide valuable insight into which components of health‐care reform at the national level may help address the health insurance problem.