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Quagmire in Civil War
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 136, Heft 1, S. 193-195
ISSN: 1538-165X
Jaroslav Tir and Johannes Karreth. 2018. Incentivizing Peace: How International Organizations Can Help Prevent Civil Wars in Member Countries (New York: Oxford University Press)
In: The review of international organizations, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 627-630
ISSN: 1559-744X
What Do We Know About Civil War Duration? A Bargaining Perspective
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"What Do We Know About Civil War Duration? A Bargaining Perspective" published on by Oxford University Press.
Preventing Civil War: How the Potential for International Intervention can Deter Conflict Onset
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 307-340
ISSN: 1086-3338
Civil wars occur in some countries at some times and not in other countries at other times. This articleexamines how the potential for large-scale external intervention can prevent civil wars. The authorargues that intervention by external states in civil war can be so overwhelming that it reduces one side's probability of victory to essentially zero. When dissidents expect this type of intervention on the side of government, they anticipate no chance of achieving success through violence and do not initiate civil wars. When governments anticipate this type of intervention on their behalf, they feel protected from internal threat and are less constrained in their dealings with their populations. This repression increases grievances, leading dissidents to engage in strategies of dissent other than civil war. The authortests three implications of this argument-that states in more hierarchical relationships will experience civil war at lower rates, be more repressive, and experience other forms of dissent at higher rates-and finds strong support for it.
Preventing civil war
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 307-340
ISSN: 0043-8871
World Affairs Online
The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper: Civil-Military Relations and the United Nations. By Arturo C. Sotomayor. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2014. 280p. $39.95
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 260-261
ISSN: 1541-0986
Who Gets What in Peace Agreements?
In: The Slippery Slope to GenocideReducing Identity Conflicts and Preventing Mass Murder, S. 248-269
Thyne, Clayton L (2009) How International Relations Affect Civil Conflict: Cheap Signals, Costly Consequences. Lanham, MA: Lexington. 239 pp. ISBN 9780739135464
In: Journal of peace research, Band 47, Heft 4, S. 516-517
ISSN: 1460-3578
Handbook of War Studies III: The Intrastate Dimension. Edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009. 392p. $35.00
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 717-718
ISSN: 1541-0986
Blocking resolution: How external states can prolong civil wars
In: Journal of peace research, Band 47, Heft 2, S. 115-127
ISSN: 1460-3578
What explains the effect of external intervention on the duration of civil war? The literature on intervention has made some progress in addressing this question, but it has been hindered by an assumption that states intervene in civil wars either to help one side win or to facilitate negotiations. Often, however, external states become involved in civil war to pursue an agenda which is separate from the goals of the internal combatants. When states intervene in this fashion, they make wars more difficult to resolve for two reasons. First, doing so introduces another actor that must approve any settlement to end the war. Second, external states generally have less incentive to negotiate than internal actors because they bear lower costs of fighting and they can anticipate gaining less benefit from negotiation than domestic insurgents. Through Cox regressions using data on the goals of all interventions in civil wars since World War II, this article shows that when states intervene with an independent agenda, they make wars substantially longer. The effect of independent interventions is much larger than that of external interventions generally, suggesting that the established finding that external interventions prolong civil war is driven by a subset of cases where states have intervened in conflicts to pursue independent goals.
How International Relations Affect Civil Conflict: Cheap Signals, Costly Consequences
In: Journal of peace research, Band 47, Heft 4, S. 516-517
ISSN: 1460-3578
Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior
In: Journal of peace research, Band 47, Heft 6, S. 812-813
ISSN: 0022-3433
Blocking resolution: how external states can prolong civil wars
In: Journal of peace research, Band 47, Heft 2, S. 115-127
ISSN: 0022-3433
World Affairs Online
Handbook of War Studies III: The Intrastate Dimension
In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 717-718
ISSN: 1537-5927