Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Information and Power in the House -- Chapter 3. Flows of Information in the House -- Chapter 4. Turning Out the Lights: Restricting Information -- Chapter 5. Leadership-Driven Partisanship -- Chapter 6. Two Cases of Leadership -- Chapter 7. Trust and the Limits to Leadership -- Chapter 8. Representation in the Dark -- Appendix A: Notes on the Qualitative Methods -- Appendix B: Notes on the Quantitative Methods -- Notes -- References -- Index.

Does how Congress makes a law affect public approval of that law? This question has been little studied, but the rising use of unorthodox processes in Congress raises concerns about the perceived legitimacy of congressional action among the public. Utilizing two unique survey experiments, I present evidence that when people are aware of the use of unorthodox legislative processes they express lower levels of approval for new laws. This effect is especially pronounced among partisans already inclined to be in opposition to the law, further solidifying their opposition. These findings have important implications for a Congress that in recent years has increasingly turned to unorthodox legislative processes to pass legislation.

Scholars, practitioners, and observers typically portray committee influence as rooted in traditional congressional processes and practices, which are thought to provide committees with powerful opportunities to block and shape legislative proposals. The erosion of regular order processes suggests these traditional processes cannot underlie committee power in the contemporary Congress. Drawing on a mixed‐methods approach of interviews with congressional staff and an original data set of every amendment offered on the floor of the House of Representatives from 2005 to 2008, I find that absent these traditional process norms, committees in the contemporary Congress can rely on their specialized knowledge and expertise to influence the behavior of their colleagues and shape the legislation that passes.

Majority Party Capacity in a Polarized Era -- The Persistence of Bipartisan Lawmaking -- Why Do Majority Parties Fail? -- How Do Majority Parties Succeed? -- Bipartisanship and the Decline of Regular Order -- Credit Claiming and Blaming: How Members React to Legislation in Public -- Constancy and Continuities.

Do interpersonal relationships among and between representatives and senators affect legislative collaboration in the contemporary Congress? The extant literature on Congress suggests interpersonal dimensions of life on Capitol Hill should play a minimal role in the legislative process. However, research in other fields, including psychology, finds that relationships are crucially important within organizations. In addition, many contemporary accounts of congressional deal‐making highlight the role of personal relationships. Drawing on interviews with high‐level congressional staff, and data on CODEL trips taken by members of Congress, we show that interpersonal relationships help promote collaboration across the aisle. These findings have implications for how we understand the contours of conflict and cooperation on Capitol Hill.