In this short paper, I want to consider the controversial question of whether archaeologists should work with the military, principally in Iraq. During the course of 2008, the British Museum and the British Army collaborated in a project to inspect archaeological sites in the south of Iraq and to develop plans for a new museum in Basra. I shall describe the background to this collaboration, and consider the ethical questions arising from this arrangement.
China is on the road to becoming a powerful force in global financial markets; statistics suggest that already some 20 per cent of the world's trade finance is currently conducted in the country's currency — the yuan, or renminbi (RMB). That is a twentyfold increase in just five years. Canada has shrewdly connected its own financial system to that of China's, well before many other countries, in securing permission from China to host one of the world's few renminbi trading hubs. The creation of these trading hubs is an important milestone for China in the long process of the internationalization of its currency. Hosting such a hub is an important milestone for Canada, in that it can help further the increase in bilateral trade and investment, the expanding exchange of businesspeople and students, and the official presence on the ground on the part of both countries' governments. A key benefit of the creation of an RMB trading centre in Canada is that it will enable Canadian financial institutions to develop a capacity to trade, and an expertise in trading, Chinese currency for non-Chinese financial instruments (such as stocks, bonds, etc.), and converting Canadian currency into Chinese investments. While this may seem straightforward, given the fact that so many different currencies are exchanged freely on global markets each day, the renminbi is unique in the fact that it has been a highly controlled, largely inaccessible currency. That has historically hampered its liquidity and added much more risk than is the case with other major currencies. Canada's RMB trading hub will reduce those difficulties and risks. Just as significant, however, is the symbolism of Canada's new hub (which, really, is just a virtual hub, comprised of computer systems, rather than a physical office or trading floor). The designation of Canada as host to an RMB centre — one of just nine in the world, and the only one in North America — was the result of several years of co-ordinated and co-operative advocacy on the part of Canadian businesses and governments who recognized its future importance. And it is a more important step forward in Canada-China bilateral relations than it has perhaps been given credit for. As China marches towards internationalization and liberalization, Canada has positioned itself well as an early partner in that progress. The RMB trading centre might be just a small step, but it is a vital one, in ensuring that Canada remains closer to, and more connected to, China as it emerges as a powerful global force in the world's financial markets.
Canadians may have good reason to feel generally positive about the outcome of the negotiations that resulted in the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement in October. There are, after all, many important sectors that will benefit from the mega-regional trade deal, and in its current form, the agreement will benefit Canada overall. But it would be premature to allow hopes to get too high just yet. There are still a number of things that must go right for Canada to fully enjoy those benefits, and there is no guarantee that they will. One of the major uncertainties is whether the most important TPP country of all, the United States, will even approve and implement to the deal. While the current administration in Washington is obviously a champion of the TPP, Americans are embarking on what will be a heated electoral cycle, both a presidential election and congressional elections. The politics of the TPP are very much unsettled in the U.S. in a way that they are not in all the other TPP countries, including in Canada, and it is not entirely implausible that the TPP as it has been negotiated will never see the light of day. Without U.S. congressional approval, the deal is as good as dead. Even if the TPP is implemented as negotiated, the deal fails yet again to deal with many of the trade irritants between Canada and the U.S. that have existed since before the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, but have yet to be cleared up. Both Canada and Mexico were shrewd enough to realize that once the U.S. entered into TPP negotiations, it was incumbent on them both to join in as well, to preserve their preferential trade status in the American market, which they had already secured through NAFTA, and would not want to lose. But since NAFTA and even for many years before, the U.S. has continued to utilize countervailing tariffs and related measures to interfere with the intended free-flow of trade across North American borders. The TPP does not bring any further discipline to these practices, again leaving Canada to deal with ongoing irritants in its most significant trading relationship. And if Canada is ever to enjoy the TPP's full potential benefits, there will also need to be a regulatory realignment of standards in our U.S. trading relationship, reducing barriers to entry in areas such as approval for pharmaceuticals. That is not part of the TPP as negotiated. That said, there are provisions in the TPP that have not previously appeared in Canadian trade deals, and could have interesting and possibly important impacts. Specifically, the TPP includes provisions that require state-owned enterprises (SOEs), common in many TPP countries, to operate on a more commercial and transparent basis. Provisions on labour and the environment are integral to the agreement in a way that they are not in NAFTA, and are spelled out clearly. And there are novel chapters on new technologies, including digital trade and e-commerce, which raise interesting questions about privacy, security and the collection and location of data. These are innovative elements and, much more than NAFTA and other current trade agreements, make this agreement a model for future agreements and perhaps even for the World Trade Organization's global trade framework.
Canadians may have good reason to feel generally positive about the outcome of the negotiations that resulted in the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement in October. There are, after all, many important sectors that will benefit from the mega-regional trade deal, and in its current form, the agreement will benefit Canada overall. But it would be premature to allow hopes to get too high just yet. There are still a number of things that must go right for Canada to fully enjoy those benefits, and there is no guarantee that they will. One of the major uncertainties is whether the most important TPP country of all, the United States, will even approve and implement to the deal. While the current administration in Washington is obviously a champion of the TPP, Americans are embarking on what will be a heated electoral cycle, both a presidential election and congressional elections. The politics of the TPP are very much unsettled in the U.S. in a way that they are not in all the other TPP countries, including in Canada, and it is not entirely implausible that the TPP as it has been negotiated will never see the light of day. Without U.S. congressional approval, the deal is as good as dead. Even if the TPP is implemented as negotiated, the deal fails yet again to deal with many of the trade irritants between Canada and the U.S. that have existed since before the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, but have yet to be cleared up. Both Canada and Mexico were shrewd enough to realize that once the U.S. entered into TPP negotiations, it was incumbent on them both to join in as well, to preserve their preferential trade status in the American market, which they had already secured through NAFTA, and would not want to lose. But since NAFTA and even for many years before, the U.S. has continued to utilize countervailing tariffs and related measures to interfere with the intended free-flow of trade across North American borders. The TPP does not bring any further discipline to these practices, again leaving Canada to deal with ongoing irritants in its most significant trading relationship. And if Canada is ever to enjoy the TPP's full potential benefits, there will also need to be a regulatory realignment of standards in our U.S. trading relationship, reducing barriers to entry in areas such as approval for pharmaceuticals. That is not part of the TPP as negotiated. That said, there are provisions in the TPP that have not previously appeared in Canadian trade deals, and could have interesting and possibly important impacts. Specifically, the TPP includes provisions that require state-owned enterprises (SOEs), common in many TPP countries, to operate on a more commercial and transparent basis. Provisions on labour and the environment are integral to the agreement in a way that they are not in NAFTA, and are spelled out clearly. And there are novel chapters on new technologies, including digital trade and e-commerce, which raise interesting questions about privacy, security and the collection and location of data. These are innovative elements and, much more than NAFTA and other current trade agreements, make this agreement a model for future agreements and perhaps even for the World Trade Organization's global trade framework.
As we look ahead following last year's U.S. presidential and congressional elections, Canadians — and Canadian business in particular — will want to have a better sense of the economic prospects, as well as the context, of U.S. foreign economic policy over the coming half-decade or so. For, notwithstanding all the talk, debates, op-ed articles, thinktank-pieces and even books in recent years suggesting or asserting the decline of American economic power, Canada's ever-present integration and interdependence with our southern neighbour is both a reality and now, again, an important, medium-term asset. Over the coming four years and likely beyond, and once it has completed sorting out its "fiscal cliff" matter, the U.S. is positioned to be the source of increasing economic growth. The American economy has strengths: its high productivity and innovation compared to most other countries, massive piles of private sector cash leading to all sorts of investment potential, a devalued currency, and a relatively young workforce compared to the European Union, Japan, and even Canada. Therefore, although the U.S. economy continues to face large challenges related to fiscal imbalances, there are reasons to expect increasing economic growth over the medium term. Volume
As we look ahead following last year's U.S. presidential and congressional elections, Canadians — and Canadian business in particular — will want to have a better sense of the economic prospects, as well as the context, of U.S. foreign economic policy over the coming half-decade or so. For, notwithstanding all the talk, debates, op-ed articles, thinktank-pieces and even books in recent years suggesting or asserting the decline of American economic power, Canada's ever-present integration and interdependence with our southern neighbour is both a reality and now, again, an important, medium-term asset. Over the coming four years and likely beyond, and once it has completed sorting out its "fiscal cliff" matter, the U.S. is positioned to be the source of increasing economic growth. The American economy has strengths: its high productivity and innovation compared to most other countries, massive piles of private sector cash leading to all sorts of investment potential, a devalued currency, and a relatively young workforce compared to the European Union, Japan, and even Canada. Therefore, although the U.S. economy continues to face large challenges related to fiscal imbalances, there are reasons to expect increasing economic growth over the medium term. Volume
