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AbstractThe Integrated Values Survey shows that the positive relationship between religiosity and market friendliness is a uniquely Western feature. With the help of public choice theory, the author hypothesises that this Western uniqueness is the result of the way the dimensions of political ideologies are formed in the West. The hypothesis is supported by regressing an index of market friendliness on a religiosity index, political identity, and a measure of 'ideological capital'. Accounting for the latter two, the positive association of religiosity with market friendliness vanishes, even in the West.

AbstractIn an attempt to contribute to the literature on how and why confidence in market participants and in the government shape the demand for market regulation, this paper contrasts two interpretations. The interpretation implicit in the empirical literature supposes that people trade off market failures for government failures. The paper argues that implicit in the broader public choice literature there is an alternative that emphasizes the nirvana fallacy and leads to the conclusion that people's views on markets and government in general is a determinant of the effect of trust on the demand for regulation. The paper applies a meta-regression analysis to examine the results of country-level regressions with different survey waves of the Integrated Values Surveys. It shows that the effect of the two kinds of trust are asymmetric and that the negative effect of the confidence in companies on the demand for government regulation is larger in countries that score higher on individualism.

AbstractThe paper uses data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study on individuals in Hungary and its neighbouring countries to examine the effects of political borders on different beliefs, as opposed to that of ethnic differences or historical borders. The focus on Hungary and its neighbours is explained by the fact that parts of the Hungarian ethno-linguistic community can be found in all these countries, which makes it possible to separate the effect of culture from that of the current political community. By applying a cultural gravity model which is concerned with the differences in beliefs between all possible pairs of individuals in the sample, the paper finds that out of five areas of beliefs, it is the beliefs regarding work, markets, and democracy whose differences are robustly affected by political borders, giving some support to the approach which argues that values are shaped through the dialogue occurring within a political community.*

Resumen: Este artículo intenta contribuir a la comprensión de las formas en que las creencias de las personas sobre la economía de mercado configuran la libertad económica. El artículo integra la noción de cultura como "espíritus de los mercados" en la literatura cuantitativa entre países sobre cultura e instituciones, al modelarlo como un sistema multidimensional de creencias sobre la economía de mercado. Propone que es la consistencia de las creencias, no las creencias en sí, lo que puede estar "incrustado" en la cultura y, por lo tanto, la consistencia de las creencias puede considerarse como un determinante de la libertad económica. Con creencias distribuidas más consistentemente, un aumento constante en la libertad económica creará más "perdedores ideológicos" en el electorado, lo que crea una posibilidad política empresarial para compensarlos. Como tal compensación generalmente toma la forma de una reducción en la libertad económica, la implicación es que aquellas áreas de libertad económica que se ven afectadas por esta compensación reflejarán menos libertad en países libres. Esta propuesta está respaldada por algunos análisis estadísticos con las áreas de libertad económica como variables dependientes y las medidas de (in) consistencia de las creencias del mercado que forman la Encuesta Mundial de Valores (European Values Study) como dependientes. ; Abstract: This paper attempts to contribute to the understanding of the ways people's beliefs about the market economy shapes economic freedom. The paper integrates the notion of culture as 'spirits of markets' into the cross-country quantitative literature on culture and institutions by modelling it as a multi-dimensional system of beliefs about the market economy. It proposes that it is the consistency of beliefs, not the beliefs themselves, that may be 'embedded' in culture, and therefore the consistency of beliefs may be considered as a determinant of economic freedom. With more consistently distributed beliefs a consistent increase in economic freedom will create more 'ideological losers" in the electorate, which creates a political entrepreneurial possibility to compensate them. As such compensation usually takes the form of a reduction in economic freedom, the implication is that those areas of economic freedom that are affected by this compensation will reflect less freedom in otherwise free countries. These proposition is supported by some statistical analyses with the areas of economic freedom as dependent variables and the measures of (in)consistency of market beliefs form the World Values Survey (European Values Study) as dependent ones.

This paper attempts to contribute to the understanding of the ways people's beliefs about the market economy shapes economic freedom. The paper integrates the notion of culture as 'spirits of markets' into the cross-country quantitative literature on culture and institutions by modelling it as a multi-dimensional system of beliefs about the market economy. It proposes that it is the consistency of beliefs, not the beliefs themselves, that may be 'embedded' in culture, and therefore the consistency of beliefs may be considered as a determinant of economic freedom. With more consistently distributed beliefs a consistent increase in economic freedom will create more 'ideological losers" in the electorate, which creates a political entrepreneurial possibility to compensate them. As such compensation usually takes the form of a reduction in economic freedom, the implication is that those areas of economic freedom that are affected by this compensation will reflect less freedom in otherwise free countries. These proposition is supported by some statistical analyses with the areas of economic freedom as dependent variables and the measures of (in)consistency of market beliefs form the World Values Survey (European Values Study) as dependent ones.

AbstractThis article demonstrates the existence of conglomerates of nations that seem to have similar ideological attitudes towards capitalism. The main finding is the existence of relatively homogeneous global cultural clusters, the Anglosphere and Northern European nations showing the highest appreciation for free markets, followed by the Sinosphere. The rest of the world tends to be more anti‐capitalist, with the Middle East and Eastern Europe standing out for being at the end of the spectrum. Statistical analysis suggests that the capitalist mentality is to some extent autonomous, and does not seem to be determined strongly by other variables such as income, growth or inequality. At the same time, the capitalistic mentality appears to correlate with economic freedom, as measured by the Economic Freedom of the World index. If a pro‐capitalist ideology is connected to institutional development, then some conglomerates seem to be in a better position to attain or maintain economic growth in the future.