Suchergebnisse

Peut-on parler d'intelligence, d'intentionnalité et d'agence lorsqu'on observe les interactions d'un agent artificiel orienté par des algorithmes ? Et comment l'interaction d'un agent artificiel modifie-t-elle l'agence de l'être humain ? Partant de la "théorie de l'exonération" postulée par l'anthropologie philosophique et l'intégrant à la théorie relationnelle, nous examinerons dans cette recherche les effets déterminés par l'interaction asymétrique entre l'être humain et l'algorithme. Ce dernier, pour être efficace en termes de résultats prédictifs, doit rendre l'environnement stable et le comportement humain prévisible. Mais une société prévisible est contre-productive et handicapante pour l'être humain sur le plan relationnel. L'être humain doit donc changer sa perspective relationnelle avec l'IA, en évaluant de manière réflexive non seulement les résultats positifs/négatifs, mais aussi les aspects facilitateurs/ incapacitants.

The social sciences have been investigating the processes of public opinion formation since the second half of the 19th century. From Tocqueville to Le Bon, from Toennies to Allport, from Lazarsfeld to Habermas, from Niklas Luhmann to Pierre Bourdieu, from Noelle-Neumann to Landowski. Among these authors, Lippmann stands out for his theoretical-practical orientation that anticipated themes and methodologies. Exactly one hundred years ago, in his best-known work Public Opinion (Lippmann 1922) he had opened the way to the inevitability of the construction of a world 'beyond the real', through the concept of 'pseudo-environment'.
The need for representation determines 'pseudo-environments', interstitial realities made up of stereotyped images and contents that the public interprets to construct shared imaginaries that do not adhere to reality: "The world outside and the picture in your head" (Lippmann 1992: 3).
Pseudo-environments enable decision-making and action, reducing complexity (Luhmann e De Giorgi 1992). This phenomenon anticipates the paradigm of hyper-reality, in the sense of Braudillard (1985), but also that of Second Life and the Meta-verse in the sense of Stephenson (1992).
Starting from Lippmann's vision, this proposed paper intends to recontextualize his thought in the light of the most recent theories of communication.

Abstract
This study investigates the effectiveness of international environmental agreements (IEAs) and how it might be affected by the development of pro-environmental behaviour among households and firms. We propose a new framework based on a two-nested-game approach composed by: (1) a one-shot game with two asymmetric countries that negotiate the international abatement target, and (2) an evolutionary game which describes the economic structure resulting from agents' interactions. These two games are nested because the initial economic structure determines the welfare of each country, and thus the outcome of Game 1 which, in turn, is embedded in Game 2, modifies the agents' pay-off and the economic structure thereof. Numerical simulation outcomes suggest three key messages. First, we find that global solutions do not automatically produce the expected effects irrespective of any free-riding assumption. Second, extreme climate risks might not lead to a high abatement target in the event of marked cross-country inequality. Third, adverse consumers' environmental attitudes might hamper the success of an IEA. The above observations entail that governments should not simply impose environmental laws. Rather, top-down policies and bottom-up interventions should be coordinated; otherwise, they might fail if undertaken in isolation.

Graphic abstract

Abstract
In this paper we analyse how the distribution of land property rights affects industrial takeoff and aggregate income through its impact on effective demand. We apply a modified version of the model provided in Murphy et al. (1989, QJE) which allows us to analyse the role of land distribution when it is independent of the distribution of firm ownership. We extend the result of Murphy et al. (1989, QJE) by showing that industrialization and income depend non-monotonically on the distribution of land and by demonstrating that this result is due to the way land distribution affects the distribution of profits among firms. Moreover, we show that there may be a tradeoff between industrialization and income, the latter being associated with a distribution of land which is more equal than that associated with maximum industrialization.