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Collective action initiatives in which governments and companies make anti-corruption commitments have proliferated in recent years. This apparently prosocial behavior defies the logic of collective action and, given that bribery often goes undetected and unpunished, is not easily explained by principal-agent theory. Club theory suggests that the answer lies in the institutional design of anti-corruption clubs: collective action can work as long as membership has high entry costs, members receive selective benefits, and compliance is adequately policed. This article contributes to the debate by examining how these conditions manifest in the case of anti-corruption clubs in the realm of international business, with particular focus on the international dimension of many initiatives. This vertical aspect of institutional design creates a richer, more complex set of reputational and material benefits for members, as well as allowing for more credible and consistent monitoring and enforcement.

Incoming governments sometimes abuse their power to manipulate the allocation of government contracts so as to buy loyalty from cronies. While scandals suggest such practices are relatively widespread, the extent of such partisan favoritism is difficult to measure and the conditions under which it flourishes under-theorized. Drawing on theory regarding the role of institutions as constraints on corruption, we identify three spheres of political influence over government contracting and show how elites can manipulate two of those spheres to increase their opportunities to influence the procurement process and minimize external accountability, facilitating the corrupt allocation of contracts to partisan allies. Using an innovative big data methodology, we then identify the effects of a change in government on procurement markets in two countries, Hungary and the United Kingdom, which differ in terms of political influence over these institutions. We find that politically-favored companies secure 50–60% of the central government contracting market in Hungary but only 10% in the UK.

This article explores how realism in political theory can inform our understanding of political corruption. Whereas political moralists see corruption as a problem of implementation, which does not undermine their values, realists see corruption as posing a more fundamental problem, challenging the very nature of politics and undermining the attempt to establish and exercise authority in the ordering of conflict and the allocation of resources. Recent realist work has sought to characterize a discrete type of "institutional" corruption, and to construct political corruption as the antithesis of good governance or impartiality. Other work has focused on the micro level, drawing on new insights from psychology and experimental economics to analyze individual decisions and motivations to behave corruptly. This article challenges scholars to build future research upon a richer understanding of the realities of political life that are intrinsic to both individual and institutional patterns of corruption.

AbstractTransparency reforms make government contracting more open and amenable to public scrutiny, helping to improve public spending efficiency. But they are also politically sensitive, complex and highly technical, which makes them especially difficult to implement if state capacity is weak. Our research on nine low‐ and middle‐income countries in Africa and Asia systematically assesses progress in improving the legal framework for procurement transparency and implementing systems that allow open access to data, between 2008 and 2019. Through interviews with key informants, we explore the reasons for progress or its absence, finding that success relies on strong leadership commitment, broad coalitions of state and non‐state actors, and sufficient technical capacity. Leadership commitment ensures that implementing bodies have the appropriate mandate and resources, while broad coalitions sustain commitment and harness external technical assistance. Both factors are best achieved by framing the reforms as a way of improving efficiency rather than fighting corruption.

AbstractFollowing scandals about corruption in foreign aid, and in a political climate that increasingly questions the legitimacy of development assistance, donors are under pressure to better control how their funds are spent. However, there is little evidence on precisely how to control corruption in development aid. This article assesses under which conditions donor regulations are successful in controlling corruption in aid spent by national governments through procurement tenders. The article analyses data on donor-funded procurement contracts in 100+ countries in 1998–2008 and uses 'single bid submitted in a competitive tender' as a corruption risk indicator. Applying a contract-level propensity score matching and regression analysis, it finds that an intervention which increases donor oversight and widens access to tenders is effective in reducing corruption risks: lowering single bidding on competitive markets by 3.6–4.3 percentage points. This effect is greater in countries with low-state capacity.

Following scandals about corruption in foreign aid, and in a political climate that increasingly questions the legitimacy of development assistance, donors are under pressure to better control how their funds are spent. However, there is little evidence on precisely how to control corruption in development aid. This article assesses under which conditions donor regulations are successful in controlling corruption in aid spent by national governments through procurement tenders. The article analyses data on donor-funded procurement contracts in 100+ countries in 1998–2008 and uses 'single bid submitted in a competitive tender' as a corruption risk indicator. Applying a contract-level propensity score matching and regression analysis, it finds that an intervention which increases donor oversight and widens access to tenders is effective in reducing corruption risks: lowering single bidding on competitive markets by 3.6–4.3 percentage points. This effect is greater in countries with low-state capacity.