Suchergebnisse

Abstract
While we would expect secularisation to have important consequences for voting behaviour, data limitations in previous studies leave the specific implications of secularisation for Canadian electoral politics unclear. Using a data set covering the period between 1975 and 2005, this study examines which aspects of secularisation have affected the partisan balance of the electorate by estimating the effects of religious belonging, behaving, and believing on party preferences. The results show that while the effects of religion (and other social identities) have not changed over time, changes in the composition of the electorate resulting from the growing share of non-religious Canadians holding liberal views on questions of personal morality has benefited the NDP and undercut support for the Conservatives.

While we would expect secularisation to have important consequences for voting behaviour, data limitations in previous studies leave the specific implications of secularisation for Canadian electoral politics unclear. Using a data set covering the period between 1975 and 2005, this study examines which aspects of secularisation have affected the partisan balance of the electorate by estimating the effects of religious belonging, behaving, and believing on party preferences. The results show that while the effects of religion (and other social identities) have not changed over time, changes in the composition of the electorate resulting from the growing share of non-religious Canadians holding liberal views on questions of personal morality has benefited the NDP and undercut support for the Conservatives.

With countries like Chile facing secularisation, some research predicts religious‐secular cleavages will 'dealign', while other research suggests these cleavages will persist so long as religious‐secular divisions are reflected among presidential candidates. Using surveys of first‐round voting intentions in the five most recent presidential elections in Chile, the analysis shows that religious‐secular divisions in voting appear when candidates are divided clearly along religious‐secular lines (and not when divisions among candidates are blurred). These findings suggest researchers need to account for the impact candidates' positions have on the appearance of religious‐secular divisions before declaring that dealignment has occurred.

Despite secularisation, there is growing recognition that some religious parties continue to influence elections and the formation of policy in several countries. But what explains why religious parties persist in some countries but not others? This study tests an argument holding that religious diversification promotes political cooperation and therefore reduces the number of religious parties. Using a data set of religious parties across advanced industrial democracies between 1945 and 2011, this paper analyses this argument and finds that religious diversity puts downward pressure on the number of religious parties over time.

While the literature on tactical voting suggests third parties are not likely to form under first-past-the-post rules, the literature also provides several potential explanations for why third parties have flourished in several first-past-the-post systems, and why voters will support these parties. This research note examines the most popular of these explanations, which holds that voters supporting parties placing third or worse in their district fail to recognize their party is out of the running. Using Canadian Election Study data from three recent elections, the results show that most voters supporting parties placing third or worse in their districts recognize that their parties are not likely to finish first or second. These results suggest more attention should be paid to other potential explanations for third-party voting in first-past-the-post systems.

"Electoral Choice and Religion: An Overview" published on by Oxford University Press.

Donald Trump is one of the least popular presidents in recent history - and yet his approval ratings among Republicans remain high. Christopher D. Raymond looks at President Trump's popularity among the GOP, even as he introduces policies, such as the separation of immigrant children from their families, which many Americans oppose. He writes that up until now Republicans have been reluctant to abandon their party because of Trump, something that seems likely to continue.

While the literature on tactical voting suggests third parties are not likely to form under first-past-the-post rules, the literature also provides several potential explanations for why third parties have flourished in several first-past-the-post systems, and why voters will support these parties. This research note examines the most popular of these explanations, which holds that voters supporting parties placing third or worse in their district fail to recognize their party is out of the running. Using Canadian Election Study data from three recent elections, the results show that most voters supporting parties placing third or worse in their districts recognize that their parties are not likely to finish first or second. These results suggest more attention should be paid to other potential explanations for third-party voting in first-past-the-post systems.

While recent studies suggest the party loyalties of Members of Parliament (MPs) influence voting behaviour on free votes independently of personal preferences, it remains to be seen to what extent party loyalties influence MPs' voting behaviour more generally. To this end, this article examines the impact of the partisan context of the vote on the effects of party loyalties. Using data from 20 divisions decided largely as free votes and controlling for personal preferences using a survey measuring MPs' attitudes, the analysis shows that the effect of party loyalty on voting behaviour is strongest under the most partisan conditions: when the outcome is anticipated to be close and most consequential to the success/failure of a bill. These findings suggest party loyalty effects may emerge on other highly partisan divisions with partisan consequences and not appear on less partisan divisions.

Most studies of electoral behaviour in New Zealand do not pay much attention to thereligious-secular cleavage. While a few studies noted a religious-secular cleavage prior to theadoption of proportional representation, most have assumed that such a divide since 1996 hasbeen confined to the margins of electoral politics, with religious voters supporting smallerthird parties over National. This article re-evaluates this conclusion using data from the NewZealand Election Study since 1990. The analyses show that, rather than supporting smallthird parties more clearly representing issues of concern to them, religious voters have votedlargely for National in most elections as part of a religious-secular cleavage between Nationaland Labour. Fluctuation in support for National among religious voters is tied to National'selectoral fortunes: religious voters have been more likely to support National when the partyhas been likely to form the next government, but more likely to cast votes for third partieswhen National's prospects have been poor.