Suchergebnisse

THIS STUDY EXPLORES THE CLEAUAGE STRUCTURE UNDERLYING ROLL CALL VOTES IN THE DANISH PARLIAMENT IN THE 1953-73 PERIOD. DIMENSIONAL TECHNIQUES ARE USED TO UNCOVER THE CLEAVAGE STRUCTURE UNDERLYING THE AGGREGATE OF ROLL CALL VOTES IN EACH OF THE SEVEN GOVERNMENTAL PERIODS IN THIS STUDY. A LAST ANALYSIS EXAMINES THE CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF BOTH MASSES AND ELITES OF THIS CLEAVAGE STRUCTURE.

THIS ARTICLE REVIEWS THE FAIRLY LIMITED RESEARCH ON THE ROLES OF DANISH MPS. ANALYTICALLY, ONE MAY DISTINGUISH BETWEEN ROLES RELATING TO REPRESENTATION AND TO DECISION MAKING. PARTY IS THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF REPRESENTATION, ALTHOUGH ELECTORAL DISTRICTS AND INTEREST GROUPS ARE ALSO IMPORTANT TO SEVERAL MPS. IN TERMS OF REPRESENTATIONAL STYLE, MPS DIFFER ACCORDING TO PARTY AFFILIATION: PARTY DELEGATE VIEWS DOMINATE IN LEFTIST PARTIES, WHEREAS TRUSTEE CONVICTIONS DOMINATE IN THE PARTIES OF THE CENTER AND RIGHT. DECISION-MAKING ROLES GENERALLY INCLUDE SUBJECT-MATTER SPECIALIZATION. THE MORE SPECIFIC ROLE BEHAVIOR OF MPS DEPENDS VERY MUCH UPON WHETHER THEIR PARTY IS IN GOVERNMENT OR OPPOSITION.

THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE OVERALL QUESTION OF HOW MORE THAN A QUARTER-CENTURY OF EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERSHIP HAS AFFECTED NATIONAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES. THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED CONCERN MEMBERSHIP EFFECTS ON DELEGATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN VOTERS, MP'S, THE CABINET, AND THE CIVIL SERVICE. THE ARTICLE IS PRINCIPALLY FOCUSED ON THE "EX ANTE" AND "EX POST" INSTRUMENTS OF CONTROL AVAILABLE TO DANISH PRINCIPALS, AND IN HOW THESE INSTRUMENTS AND THEIR USE HAVE CHANGED WITH EU MEMBERSHIP. THUS, WHILE THE MAIN FOCUS IS ON ACCOUNTABILITY AS A PROCESS OF REPRESENTATION, THE ARTICLE ALSO REFERS TO ACCOUNTABILITY AS A POLICY OUTCOME OF REPRESENTATION.

The assumption that parties in government command legislative majorities that can be used to enact desired policies does not apply to Denmark. Explores the policy consequences of minority government during the 1980s. It is shown that the government may in fact not always govern, that the government may actually be the opposition, and, consequently, that the party-policy link can indeed be extremely complex. (Abstract amended)