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The question whether the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) will result in measurable economic benefits is of special policy relevance in particular given the European Union?s decision to require the application of IFRS by listed companies from 2005/2007. In this paper, I investigate the common conjecture that internationally recognized high quality reporting standards (IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP) reduce the cost of capital of adopting firms (e.g. Levitt 1998; IASB 2002). Building on Leuz/Verrecchia (2000), I use a set of German firms which preadopted such standards before 2005, but investigate the potential economic benefits by analyzing their expected cost of equity capital utilizing and customizing available implied estimation methods (e.g. Gebhardt/Lee/Swaminathan 2001, Easton/Taylor/Shroff/Sougiannis 2002, Easton 2004). Evidence from a sample of about 13,000 HGB, 4,500 IAS/IFRS and 3,000 US-GAAP firm-month observations in the period 1993-2002 generally fails to document lower expected cost of equity capital and therefore measurable economic benefits for firms applying IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP. Accordingly, I caution to state that reporting under internationally accepted standards, per se, lowers the cost of equity capital of adopting firms.

The question whether the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) will result in measurable economic benefits is of special policy relevance in particular given the European Union's decision to require the application of IFRS by listed companies from 2005/2007. In this paper, I investigate the common con-jecture that internationally recognized high quality reporting standards (IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP) reduce the cost of capital of adopting firms (e.g. Levitt 1998; IASB 2002). Building on Leuz/Verrecchia (2000), I use a set of German firms which pre-adopted such standards before 2005, but investigate the potential economic benefits by analyzing their expected cost of equity capital utilizing and customizing avail-able implied estimation methods (e.g. Gebhardt/Lee/Swaminathan 2001, Easton/Taylor/Shroff/Sougiannis 2002, Easton 2004). Evidence from a sample of about 13,000 HGB, 4,500 IAS/IFRS and 3,000 US-GAAP firm-month observations in the period 1993-2002 generally fails to document lower expected cost of equity capital and therefore measurable economic benefits for firms applying IAS/IFRS or US-GAAP. Accordingly, I caution to state that reporting under internationally accepted standards, per se, lowers the cost of equity capital of adopting firms.

At the peak of the financial crisis in October 2008, the IASB amended IAS 39 to grant companies the option of abandoning fair value recognition for selected financial assets. Using a comprehensive global sample of publicly listed IFRS banks, we find that banks use the reclassification option to forgo the recognition of fair value losses and ultimately the regulatory costs of supervisory intervention. Analyses of stock market reactions suggest that a small subset of the most troubled banks benefit from such reclassifications. However, analyses of related footnote disclosures reveal that two-thirds of reclassifying banks do not fully comply with the accompanying IFRS 7 requirements. These banks experience a significant increase in bid-ask spreads in the long run.

Politicians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial accounting. Evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture by special interests helps explain these interventions. However, many accounting rules have broad economic or social consequences, such as their effects on income distribution or private sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences varies with a politician's ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and explains a politician's stance on the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent U.S. political debates about fair value accounting and the expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians' involvement at exactly those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation (i.e., bank bailouts and top management compensation). Once the debates focus on more technical issues, connections to special interests remain the dominant force.

Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht, ob der Mehrheitsaktionär einer Gesellschaft im Vorfeld eines Zwangsausschlusses von Minderheitsaktionären (sog. Squeeze-Out) versucht, die Kapitalmarkterwartungen negativ zu beeinflussen. Ein solches 'manipulatives' Verhalten wird häufig in der juristischen wie betriebswirtschaftlichen Literatur unterstellt, da der Aktienkurs für die Abfindungshöhe die Wertuntergrenze bildet. Unsere empirische Untersuchung der Bilanz- und Pressemitteilungspolitik von Squeeze-Out-Unternehmen im Vorfeld der Ankündigung einer solchen Maßnahme am deutschen Kapitalmarkt zeigt, dass in diesem Zeitraum tatsächlich ein signifikanter Anstieg (Rückgang) der im Ton pessimistischen (optimistischen) Pressemitteilungen feststellbar ist. Allerdings zeigt sich weiter, dass die Aktien der Squeeze-Out-Kandidaten bereits im Vorfeld und am Tag der Ankündigung so hohe positive Überrenditen erzielen, dass der von uns quantifizierte kumulierte Effekt der Informationspolitik auf die Börsenbewertung einen insgesamt nur sehr geringen Einfluss ausübt und von anderen Faktoren (z.B. Abfindungsspekulationen) dominiert wird.