Suchergebnisse

"Amongst European autonomist parties, the Volksunie (VU) is one of the most relevant for comparative research (De Winter, Gómez-Reino and Lynch 2006). The party represents the political expression of the oldest autonomist movement in Belgium, and one of the first to be successful in electoral and office terms in Western Europe. Of the three Belgian "federalist" parties, the VU has also possibly had the largest impact on the territorial re-organisation of the political system. Finally, the VU is an example of a "mature" autonomist party that has become a victim of its own success. Its second period in state-level government (1988-1991) triggered a decade of death throws, whilst its final governing experience (1999-2003) lead the party to split in 2001 into the left-liberal post-nationalist SPIRIT and the independentist-conservative Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA). The chapter demonstrates how the rapid passing of the thresholds of declaration, authorisation, representation and relevance did not pose major problems for the VU in terms of policy and organisational adaptation. However, passing of the threshold of government too frequently and with meager policy results, placed major pressure on the party's organisational structure and policy goals, and contributed to the eventual death of the VU." (author's abstract)

The relationship between political parties & governments is explored, focusing on the executive office & policy-seeking behavior of parties & the "institutional mechanisms & contexts that make possible or impede responsible party government, especially in the case of government coalitions." Classical coalition-based theories about which parties get into government are examined & evaluated against newer (post-1980s) neoinstitutionalist theories, bargaining & action-oriented theories, & more multidimensional models. Ways that portfolios are allocated between & within parties are analyzed & the processes through which policies are defined during government formation are explored. The role of parties in the daily functioning of governments is also addressed. Tables. K. Hyatt Stewart

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020.

Abstract. Judged by their statutory arrangement the selection procedures of the seven main governmental Belgian parties in the 1944–1992 period suggest that party presidents are recruited in a fully democratic way, anticipating a contest between several candidates which is ultimately decided by a secret vote of the members' representatives at the national congress or council or, as in the PSC and recently the PRL, by a membership vote. In practice, competition only occurs in the PSC and the VU. In the other parties, the party elites usually propose a consensus candidate to the party's congress, who is then legitimated by a near‐unanimous vote or by acclamation. The elite legitimates this method by referring to the devastating effects of an open competition for the party's unity, as well as the belief that the elite can better assess the party needs and the prospective candidates' skills than the more uninvolved and inexperienced congress delegate or party member.

The selection procedures of the seven main governmental Belgian parties in the 1944-1992 period suggest that party presidents are recruited in a fully democratic way. In practice, competition only occurs in the Parti Social Chretien & the Volksunie. In the other parties, the party elites usually propose a consensus candidate to the party's congress, who is then legitimated by a near-unanimous vote or by acclamation. The elite legitimates this method by citing the devastating effects of an open competition on party unity, as well as the belief that the elite can better assess the party needs & the prospective candidates' skills than the more uninvolved & inexperienced congress delegate or party member. 3 Tables, 14 References. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract. An overview of the literature on the party‐policy link suggests a weak, non‐existent or even perverse relationship between parties in government and governmental policies in Belgium. It is argued that this weak relationship could be due to the methodology applied in this type of research, i.e. the treatment of the party variable on a much too high level of aggregation. The relative strength of the coalition parties, the parties' general ideological profile on a specific moment, the relative strength of the factions within the parliamentary party and in the Cabinet are not taken into account. On the other hand, several organisational factors with regard to the relation between parties, parliamentary groups, ministers and the administration tend to facilitate the impact of parties on policies in Belgium. Interview data with ministers suggest that the policy variable also needs further disaggregation. In particular, the qualitative aspects of policies should be more closely investigated.