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This article examines how pocketbook and sociotropic economic evaluations jointly affect economic voting behavior for those that have "fallen behind" in their personal financial conditions relative to aggregate economic performance. According to reference‐dependent and relative loss theories, those who have fallen behind should be less likely to support the incumbent president. Alternatively, attributing personal financial conditions to the incumbent is cognitively complex and can conflict with core values, and the sociotropic version of voting is typically stronger than the pocketbook version. These approaches are tested, and the results show that the sociotropic version of economic voting predominates even among those who have fallen behind. The results are robust to controls for nongovernmental sources of variation in personal financial conditions. These results have important implications for democratic accountability in an age of economic inequality.Related Articles
Stegmaier, Mary, and Michael S. Lewis‐Beck. 2009. "." Politics & Policy 37 (): 769‐780. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2009.00197.x/abstract


Regens, James L., and Michael J. Scicchitano. 1985. "." Southeastern Political Review 13 (): 183‐196. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.1985.tb00011.x/abstract


Lasley, Scott, and Mary Stegmaier. 2001. "." Politics & Policy 29 (): 545‐567. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2001.tb00602.x/abstract
Related MediaFilm Clips:
Ariely, Dan. 2008. "." http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Xcw‐kXKDB3s


. 2013. "." http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_y7Xtwxd90I

ObjectivesWe investigate whether growing income inequality has heightened differences in economic interests between "the haves" and "the have nots" and if this class polarization has increased ideological polarization in the electorate.MethodsWe examine the trend in ideological orientation among low‐ and high‐income voters from 1972 to 2008.ResultsWhile both income inequality and ideological polarization have increased in recent years, this analysis indicates that the growth in ideological polarization is not the result of growing income inequality. The well‐off have not become significantly more conservative and less liberal nor have those on the lower rungs of the economic ladder become significantly more liberal and less conservative.ConclusionThe analysis indicates that ideological polarization is the result of the increased polarization of the political parties, not class polarization.

Numerous studies indicate that political institutions play an important role in explaining variation in voter turnout across countries. The nuances of institutions unique to presidential elections have been largely overlooked, however, despite the different incentives they offer for voters to participate in elections. This article examines the effect that four presidential institutions had on voter turnout in presidential elections between 1974 and 2004—the timing of elections (whether concurrent or nonconcurrent), the power of the presidency, presidential electoral rules (plurality or majority runoff), and reelection rules. To isolate the effect of presidential institutions, this study controls for other likely influences on turnout, including the economic environment and the wider political context. It finds that (a) runoff elections dampen turnout whereas incumbency spurs it and (b) more powerful presidencies and elections, when held concurrently with legislative elections, have little effect on voter participation.