Suchergebnisse

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) increasingly feature a variety of provisions related to economic and social rights (ESR), environmental protection (EP), and civil and political rights (CPR). In this paper we estimate the effect of the degree of legalization of PTAs in these non-trade provisions on the flow of bilateral greenfield FDI. We explore this relation in a structural gravity setting and find that all three types of non-trade provisions affect the flow of FDI negatively. This effect is driven by investments directed to middle- and low-income countries, in particular for more directly economically relevant (ESR and EP) provisions. These latter are also found to have a larger negative impact on FDI between origin-destination country-pairs which differ the most in their commitment on non-trade issues in PTAs with third parties.

We estimate the trade effect of removing uncertainty about future trading conditions in the context of the 2014 reform of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) of the European Union (EU). EU GSP members receive non-reciprocal trade preferences (NRTPs), but only as long as they are not too competitive; i.e. they will graduate in case their share of EU GSP imports in a sector exceeds a certain threshold. However, the 2014 reform removed the threat of these competitiveness-related graduations for members of the so-called "GSP+", a sub-scheme of the main programme. We find that the reform increased EU imports from GSP+ countries by about 45% on average whilst tariffs stayed the same. This trade impact is driven by the country-sector pairs most exposed to NRTPs uncertainty prior to the reform. The effect is robust to taking into account other aspects of the reform, such as the reduction in GSP membership and changes in tariff margins, respectively.

We estimate the trade effect of removing uncertainty about future trading conditions in the context of the 2014 reform of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) of the European Union (EU). EU GSP members receive non-reciprocal trade preferences (NRTPs), but only as long as they are not too competitive; i.e. they will graduate in case their share of EU GSP imports in a sector exceeds a certain threshold. However, the 2014 reform removed the threat of these competitiveness-related graduations for members of the GSP+, a sub-scheme of the main programme. We find that the reform increased EU imports from GSP+ countries by about 7% on average whilst tariffs stayed the same. This trade impact is driven by the country-sector pairs most exposed to NRTPs uncertainty pre-reform. The effect is robust to taking into account other aspects of the reform, such as the reduction in GSP membership and changes in tariff margins, respectively.

Using the theoretical framework of global sourcing with firm heterogeneity, we examine determinants of inputs sourcing choices of manufacturing firms established in the EU countries. To this purpose, we combine information on the ownership structure and company accounts from the Orbis data set with input-output data from the World Input-Output Tables (WIOT) and with information on institutional and regulatory factors at country level provided by international organisations. Our research findings indicate that manufacturing firms that source inputs intra-firm via foreign direct investment (FDI) across EU countries are larger, more productive, more intensive in tangible and intangible capital and less intensive in skills than manufacturing firms that source inputs at arm's length. The probability of integrating inputs by manufacturing firms across EU countries is positively linked with the strength of legal systems, flexibility of labour markets and negatively linked to corporate tax rates and financial development in host countries. Less efficient insolvency procedures are associated with a higher probability of sourcing inputs intra-firm via FDI relative to arm's length sourcing. The probability of sourcing inputs via FDI is negatively linked to sectoral restrictions to FDI and positively linked to the impact of service regulations on downstream industries.

Multinational enterprises operating global value chains are being increasingly pressured to source from suppliers that adopt green private standards. Likewise, public policymakers are also pressured to reduce national pollution levels to contribute to sustainable development initiatives. In this context, while there is extensive debate on how domestic, country-specific environmental regulations interact with private standards (adopted by firms) in reducing national pollution levels, less is known about the role of international trade policies, which have recently embraced an array of sustainability issues. Our paper seeks to extend our understanding of the extent to which ISO environmental certifications affect a country's level of emissions of greenhouse gases and air pollutants, and whether the European Union's environmental protection (EP) standards – as mediated through trade agreements – condition this response. Prior research provides mixed evidence on the impact of the adoption of ISO-14001 on pollution reduction. Based on prior literature and using institutional theory and environmental stewardship perspectives, we expect that membership of trade agreements with EP provisions would complement the effect of ISO-14001 uptakes in reducing national pollution levels. Our arguments and results emphasize the complexity between private and public regulations on pollution reduction.

The European Union (EU) often conditions preferential access to its market on compliance with Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs), including human rights and labor and environmental standards. In this paper, we first systematically document the coverage of NTPOs across the main tools of EU trade policy: its (association and non-association) trade agreements and Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs. We then discuss the extent to which the EU can use these tools as a 'carrot-and-stick' mechanism to promote NTPOs in trading partners. We argue that, within trade agreements, the EU has limited scope to extend or restrict tariff preferences to 'reward good behavior' or 'punish bad behavior' on NTPOs, partly because multilateral rules require members to eliminate tariffs on substantially all trade. By contrast, GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis, and can thus more easily be extended or limited, depending on compliance with NTPOs. Our analysis also suggests that the commercial interests of the EU inhibit the full pursuit of NTPOs in its trade agreements and GSP programs.

The European Union (EU) often conditions preferential access to its market upon compliance by its trading partners with Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs), including human rights and labor and environmental standards. We systematically document the coverage of NTPOs in EU trade agreements and in its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). We then examine the extent to which trade agreements and GSP programs can be used to promote NTPOs. Preferential trade agreements are negotiated under multilateral rules, which require members to eliminate all tariffs reciprocally. As a result, once a trade agreement enters into force, the EU cannot easily restrict or extend access to its market so as to "punish bad behavior" or "reward good behavior" on NTPOs by its trading partners. By contrast, GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis, so they can be limited or extended, depending on compliance with NTPOs. EU GSP programs can thus provide a carrot-and-stick mechanism to promote NTPOs in partner countries.

The European Union (EU) often conditions preferential access to its market upon compliance by its trading partners with Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs), including human rights and labor and environmental standards. We systematically document the coverage of NTPOs in EU trade agreements and in its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). We then examine the extent to which trade agreements and GSP programs can be used to promote NTPOs. Preferential trade agreements are negotiated under multilateral rules, which require members to eliminate all tariffs reciprocally. As a result, once a trade agreement enters into force, the EU cannot easily restrict or extend access to its market so as to "punish bad behavior" or "reward good behavior" on NTPOs by its trading partners. By contrast, GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis, so they can be limited or extended, depending on compliance with NTPOs. EU GSP programs can thus provide a carrot-and-stick mechanism to promote NTPOs in partner countries. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published