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"An analytical approach to corporate reputations from its leading scholar. Public perception, especially in the time of social media, is a core determinant of any organization's success and longevity. It is also fickle: organizations can fall astray of public approval through crisis, mismanagement, or sudden shifts in the public sensibility. In Reputation Analytics, Daniel Diermeier offers the first scientific framework for understanding and managing the vagaries of corporate reputation and public opinion. Drawing on a political scientist's understanding of the formation and dynamics of public opinion, Diermeier infuses his approach with lessons from game theory, psychology, and text analytics to produce a rigorous, altogether original approach that will have immediate application in both scholarship and practice. A milestone work from one of social science's most eminent scholars, Reputation Analytics ushers a new and advanced understanding on a topic that has long eluded such treatment-and an essential work for readers across industry and academics"--

Abstract
We discuss the role of institutionalism in the normative analysis of public policy. In contrast to existing approaches to policy analysis, institutionalism focuses on the policy process rather than a specific policy outcome. Historically, institutionalism has been developed within the rational choice paradigm. This has led to sustained criticism by behaviorally oriented political scientists. We show that this dependence on rational choice is not a necessary component of institutionalism and discuss examples of behavioral approaches to institutional analysis.

"Nach einem Überblick über die wichtigsten Subdisziplinen der rationalchoice-orientierten Politikwissenschaft (Sozialwahltheorie, Entscheidungstheorie, Spieltheorie) geht der Beitrag auf spieltheoretische Anwendungen ein. Mit diesem Ansatz wird jede politische Entscheidungssituation als nonkooperatives Spiel modelliert. Vor allem lassen sich mit Hilfe unterschiedlicher Spielformen die Konsequenzen von verschiedenen politischen Entscheidungsregeln systematisch untersuchen. Damit besteht die Möglichkeit, auch für komplexe politische Interaktionen eine Voraussage über beobachtbares Verhalten zu geben. Zur Verdeutlichung konzentriert sich der Beitrag auf die Analyse der Entscheidungsprozesse im Bereich der Gesetzgebung." (Autorenreferat)

Informational theories of legislative institutions have demonstrated the potential collective gains from committee specialization due to the use of restrictive amendment procedures. For these benefits to be realized, however, the floor majority must overcome a commitment problem. I demonstrate that in a multistage game, majority rule, combined with the fact that generations of legislators overlap, allows the legislature to solve the commitment problem and to sustain legislative norms and institutions even if legislators are "finitely lived." The model suggests that rather than restrictive amendment procedures, it is the committee's expectation of floor deference that sustains committee specialization. As a consequence, legislative norms may collapse due to an unexpected influx of new members even if the distribution of preferences in the legislature does not change. Finally, I discuss consequences for a comparative study of legislative institutions.

AbstractWe explore the dynamics of affective partisanship and policy divergence in a behavioral voting model. Voters are adaptive and influenced by partisan affect, while political parties are rational and office motivated. We show that the affective partisanship of the electorate and the divergence of party platforms can be mutually reinforcing, thus providing an explanation for the observed co-movement of affective and elite polarization in recent decades. Whether the induced behavioral path exhibits low polarization or high polarization depends on the salience of group identity and the number of moderate voters. Thus, shocks to those factors, perhaps due to such events as economic crises or war, can lead to the polarization or depolarization of the electorate and of the elite.

We examine the interaction between partisan affect and elite
polarization in a behavioral voting model. Voting is determined by
affect rather than rational choice. Parties are office-motivated;
they choose policies to win elections. We show that parties bias
their policies toward their partisans if voters exhibit ingroup
responsiveness, i.e., they respond more strongly to their own
party's policy deviations than to policy deviations by the other
party. Our results suggest that affective polarization is a driver
of the growing elite polarization in American politics. Importantly,
this observation does not assume any shifts in the voters' bliss
points and is therefore orthogonal to the controversy over whether
the American electorate has become more polarized in ideology.