Breakthrough: the Gorlice-Tarnow campaign, 1915
In: War, technology, and history
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In: War, technology, and history
In: Modern war studies
Prussia, Germany, and coalition war, 1740-1933 -- Hitler, diplomacy, and coalition warfare -- Desert sands I -- The Balkan interlude -- Barbarossa -- Playing "va banque" -- Disaster at Stalingrad -- Desert sands II -- All fall down -- Germany and coalition warfare.
In: War in history, Band 29, Heft 1, S. 20-34
ISSN: 1477-0385
This article examines the relationship between commanders and chiefs of staff during the period of the Wars of German Unification and the entirety of the Kaiserreich. The practice of pairing up a commander and a chief of staff was one that was specific to Germany. Traditional scholarship holds that in many cases, it was really the chief of staff who did all the thinking, while the commander was nothing more than a front man. The primary example of this was the relationship between Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff. The problem is that unthinking historians have projected relationship of this particular duo on the rest of the imperial German army. One of the reasons for this was the presence of members of German royal families in high command positions. This article suggests that first, commanders, including royal family members, were far more influential than their chiefs of staff. In addition, the power wielded by chiefs of staff also reflected the nagging problem of battlefield communications, especially given the limitations of telephone and early wireless radio. Once these difficulties were eliminated by the collapse of the imperial regime, and the development of radio, the power of chiefs of staff was severely curbed by 1939. Thus, the relationship between commanders and chiefs of staff was at best a transitory phenomenon.
In: War in history, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 120-120
ISSN: 1477-0385
In: Parameters: journal of the US Army War College, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 112-114
ISSN: 0031-1723
In: War in history, Band 18, Heft 2, S. 273-274
ISSN: 1477-0385
In: The journal of military history, Band 72, Heft 4, S. 1315-1316
ISSN: 1543-7795
In: War in history, Band 12, Heft 4, S. 396-417
ISSN: 1477-0385
In October 1917 the German army and navy were able to mount a successful joint operation to seize the Baltic islands in the Gulf of Riga. Although undertaken by each service for motives of its own, and against disintegrating Russian resistance, Operation Albion was the kind of improvised operation at which the German army in particular excelled. The operation featured an interesting employment of aircraft, and marked about the only time in the First World War where the German army and navy were able to co-operate successfully. The landings secured the islands of Oesel, Moon and Dagö, thus giving the Germans the ability to use the port facilities at Riga. After the war, however, the German military establishment quickly forgot about this operation, and paid little if any attention to it in both its professional military publications and in the Kriegsakademie. Thus Albion was an unlearned lesson for the Germans in the interwar period.
In: The journal of military history, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 607
ISSN: 0899-3718
In: Small wars & insurgencies, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 199-212
ISSN: 1743-9558
In: Small wars & insurgencies, Band 14, Heft 3, S. 199-200
ISSN: 0959-2318
In: The Journal of Military History, Band 66, Heft 4, S. 1011
In: The journal of military history, Band 66, Heft 4, S. 1011-1032
ISSN: 0899-3718