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Analysts agree that public opposition is one of the main factors that hinder ambition in many countries' carbon pricing policy agenda. This article argues that motivated reasoning contributes to this opposition by inducing the public to underestimate the effectiveness of carbon pricing to mitigate climate change and yield co-benefits. This article also argues that measures of implicit carbon pricing can help overcome public opposition to carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes due to motivated reasoning. These measures are becoming increasingly available thanks to recent work by the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and private-sector actors, and therefore they offer a potential instrument for reducing public opposition to carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes in various countries. A strength of the approach proposed in this article – compared to some of the mainstream approaches to risk regulation – is that it tries is to keep the regulation of climate risks in line with public attitudes towards these risks.

The Behavioral Economics of Accuracy and Discrimination at Trial -- Truth Standards in Behavioral Law and Economics -- The Fundamental Attribution Error and Accuracy in Trial Settings: Judges vs Jurors -- Implicit Racial Biases in Tort Trials -- Gender and Race-Based Statistical Tables in European Tort Trials -- Accuracy and Discrimination at Trial: Putting the Pieces Together.

Even though carbon pricing is widely accepted as the most efficient policy instrument for climate change mitigation, it has been severely held back by a lack of public support. Building on research in behavioural sciences, we propose a revenue recycling scheme that aims to foster public support for carbon taxes. The scheme has two main strengths: (i) it may allow the implementatin of carbon taxes with higher tax rates than those currently prevailing in most jurisdictions; (ii) it relies on a number of accessible technologies, and thus it can be implemented in a wide variety of settings, both in urban and rural areas of developing and developed countries.

In this article, we study spillovers in political trust between the national parliaments of 15 Member States and the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in the period 2000–2015. We show that in most instances spillovers between the national parliaments and the European Commission and the European Parliament are bidirectional, asymmetric, and change over time and place. A corollary of these findings is that simultaneously achieving high level of trust in institutions at different levels of governance may require a deeper understanding of the complex inter-institutional relationships that exist in the EU multilevel governance setting.

In this article, we study spillovers in political trust between the national parliaments of 15 Member States and the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in the period 2000–2015. We show that in most instances spillovers between the national parliaments and the European Commission and the European Parliament are bidirectional, asymmetric, and change over time and place. A corollary of these findings is that simultaneously achieving high level of trust in institutions at different levels of governance may require a deeper understanding of the complex inter-institutional relationships that exist in the EU multilevel governance setting.