Search results

In the end of the year 2003, hundreds of thousands of Georgians went out to the streets in order to protest against the fraudulent presidential elections. Incumbent E.Shevarnadze was forced to resign. This event, called Rose Revolution, raised hope of the end of political chaos and brought a brand new democracy to the World. However, political reforms in the country revealed a different trend. According to the Freedomhouse ratings, Georgia still remains only a partly-free country as before the Revolution. Paradoxically, just a few years after the Roses of democracy were planted to the Georgian soil, the opposition again finds itself in the streets protesting against the lack of democracy. This situation raises a research question why the consequences of the Rose Revolution, which seemed a manifest of democracy in its essence, were so short-lasting. In search for the answer the author of this master thesis argues for an alternative context of analysis and theoretical background which differ from the ones prevailing in the scientific discourse on the issue. Many works rest on the premise that The Rose Revolution was an extraordinary event in the country. One of the main aims of this case study is to prove that it was not unique. Furthermore, taking into consideration "devaluation" of the term revolution in nowadays political science Georgia is worth a diagnosis of entire "revolutionary syndrome" as a similar model of the government change has taken place already a few times during the thirteen years of independence before the Rose Revolution and unsuccessful attempts to repeat it were demonstrated recently. The inquiry reveals that analysis of this phenomenon has to be performed in the context of country's political history. Otherwise, one cannot get a full and deep picture of its causes. It is not enough to refer to ad hoc success criteria of the Rose Revolution but to seek for the institutionalized thinking and behaviour patterns of the political actors which leads to the radicalization of political conflict. This goes as the second aim of this paper. The findings of this study show that the recent stagnation, if not setback, of democratization in Georgia disproves a somehow romantic scientific discourse which sees the Rose Revolution as a victory of democracy against authoritarianism. The Rose Revolution in its essence was not an extraordinary event in country's political context and not a democratic breakthrough. There are some historically formed patterns of political actors' interplay which are favourable for radicalization of political conflict. Firstly, under formally existing multi-party system, a single party permanently dominates in all branches of governance. For this reason political struggle becomes a zero-sum game. Secondly, political parties almost unexceptionally are created and dominated by a single leader. In such situation they become not organizations of political representation but more a projection of personal power and an instrument for its realization. The struggles among such parties are based not on ideological but on personal arguments. In this case, clear guidelines for solving such conflicts and making compromises do not exist. Thirdly, political leaders in Georgia tend to present themselves as apolitical. That is, they claim to represent not the interests of particular groups or ideologies but universal interests which are common to all the citizens. For this reason, a normal pluralism of interests is denied and political opponents are treated as the traitors or state enemies. Finally, a tradition of resistance to the state and bureaucratic hierarchy traces back a few centuries into Georgia's history and has acquired a self-contained value. The vitality of tradition of revolt is proved by using protest as a prevailing means of solving conflicts.

In the end of the year 2003, hundreds of thousands of Georgians went out to the streets in order to protest against the fraudulent presidential elections. Incumbent E.Shevarnadze was forced to resign. This event, called Rose Revolution, raised hope of the end of political chaos and brought a brand new democracy to the World. However, political reforms in the country revealed a different trend. According to the Freedomhouse ratings, Georgia still remains only a partly-free country as before the Revolution. Paradoxically, just a few years after the Roses of democracy were planted to the Georgian soil, the opposition again finds itself in the streets protesting against the lack of democracy. This situation raises a research question why the consequences of the Rose Revolution, which seemed a manifest of democracy in its essence, were so short-lasting. In search for the answer the author of this master thesis argues for an alternative context of analysis and theoretical background which differ from the ones prevailing in the scientific discourse on the issue. Many works rest on the premise that The Rose Revolution was an extraordinary event in the country. One of the main aims of this case study is to prove that it was not unique. Furthermore, taking into consideration "devaluation" of the term revolution in nowadays political science Georgia is worth a diagnosis of entire "revolutionary syndrome" as a similar model of the government change has taken place already a few times during the thirteen years of independence before the Rose Revolution and unsuccessful attempts to repeat it were demonstrated recently. The inquiry reveals that analysis of this phenomenon has to be performed in the context of country's political history. Otherwise, one cannot get a full and deep picture of its causes. It is not enough to refer to ad hoc success criteria of the Rose Revolution but to seek for the institutionalized thinking and behaviour patterns of the political actors which leads to the radicalization of political conflict. This goes as the second aim of this paper. The findings of this study show that the recent stagnation, if not setback, of democratization in Georgia disproves a somehow romantic scientific discourse which sees the Rose Revolution as a victory of democracy against authoritarianism. The Rose Revolution in its essence was not an extraordinary event in country's political context and not a democratic breakthrough. There are some historically formed patterns of political actors' interplay which are favourable for radicalization of political conflict. Firstly, under formally existing multi-party system, a single party permanently dominates in all branches of governance. For this reason political struggle becomes a zero-sum game. Secondly, political parties almost unexceptionally are created and dominated by a single leader. In such situation they become not organizations of political representation but more a projection of personal power and an instrument for its realization. The struggles among such parties are based not on ideological but on personal arguments. In this case, clear guidelines for solving such conflicts and making compromises do not exist. Thirdly, political leaders in Georgia tend to present themselves as apolitical. That is, they claim to represent not the interests of particular groups or ideologies but universal interests which are common to all the citizens. For this reason, a normal pluralism of interests is denied and political opponents are treated as the traitors or state enemies. Finally, a tradition of resistance to the state and bureaucratic hierarchy traces back a few centuries into Georgia's history and has acquired a self-contained value. The vitality of tradition of revolt is proved by using protest as a prevailing means of solving conflicts.

In the end of the year 2003, hundreds of thousands of Georgians went out to the streets in order to protest against the fraudulent presidential elections. Incumbent E.Shevarnadze was forced to resign. This event, called Rose Revolution, raised hope of the end of political chaos and brought a brand new democracy to the World. However, political reforms in the country revealed a different trend. According to the Freedomhouse ratings, Georgia still remains only a partly-free country as before the Revolution. Paradoxically, just a few years after the Roses of democracy were planted to the Georgian soil, the opposition again finds itself in the streets protesting against the lack of democracy. This situation raises a research question why the consequences of the Rose Revolution, which seemed a manifest of democracy in its essence, were so short-lasting. In search for the answer the author of this master thesis argues for an alternative context of analysis and theoretical background which differ from the ones prevailing in the scientific discourse on the issue. Many works rest on the premise that The Rose Revolution was an extraordinary event in the country. One of the main aims of this case study is to prove that it was not unique. Furthermore, taking into consideration "devaluation" of the term revolution in nowadays political science Georgia is worth a diagnosis of entire "revolutionary syndrome" as a similar model of the government change has taken place already a few times during the thirteen years of independence before the Rose Revolution and unsuccessful attempts to repeat it were demonstrated recently. The inquiry reveals that analysis of this phenomenon has to be performed in the context of country's political history. Otherwise, one cannot get a full and deep picture of its causes. It is not enough to refer to ad hoc success criteria of the Rose Revolution but to seek for the institutionalized thinking and behaviour patterns of the political actors which leads to the radicalization of political conflict. This goes as the second aim of this paper. The findings of this study show that the recent stagnation, if not setback, of democratization in Georgia disproves a somehow romantic scientific discourse which sees the Rose Revolution as a victory of democracy against authoritarianism. The Rose Revolution in its essence was not an extraordinary event in country's political context and not a democratic breakthrough. There are some historically formed patterns of political actors' interplay which are favourable for radicalization of political conflict. Firstly, under formally existing multi-party system, a single party permanently dominates in all branches of governance. For this reason political struggle becomes a zero-sum game. Secondly, political parties almost unexceptionally are created and dominated by a single leader. In such situation they become not organizations of political representation but more a projection of personal power and an instrument for its realization. The struggles among such parties are based not on ideological but on personal arguments. In this case, clear guidelines for solving such conflicts and making compromises do not exist. Thirdly, political leaders in Georgia tend to present themselves as apolitical. That is, they claim to represent not the interests of particular groups or ideologies but universal interests which are common to all the citizens. For this reason, a normal pluralism of interests is denied and political opponents are treated as the traitors or state enemies. Finally, a tradition of resistance to the state and bureaucratic hierarchy traces back a few centuries into Georgia's history and has acquired a self-contained value. The vitality of tradition of revolt is proved by using protest as a prevailing means of solving conflicts.

In the end of the year 2003, hundreds of thousands of Georgians went out to the streets in order to protest against the fraudulent presidential elections. Incumbent E.Shevarnadze was forced to resign. This event, called Rose Revolution, raised hope of the end of political chaos and brought a brand new democracy to the World. However, political reforms in the country revealed a different trend. According to the Freedomhouse ratings, Georgia still remains only a partly-free country as before the Revolution. Paradoxically, just a few years after the Roses of democracy were planted to the Georgian soil, the opposition again finds itself in the streets protesting against the lack of democracy. This situation raises a research question why the consequences of the Rose Revolution, which seemed a manifest of democracy in its essence, were so short-lasting. In search for the answer the author of this master thesis argues for an alternative context of analysis and theoretical background which differ from the ones prevailing in the scientific discourse on the issue. Many works rest on the premise that The Rose Revolution was an extraordinary event in the country. One of the main aims of this case study is to prove that it was not unique. Furthermore, taking into consideration "devaluation" of the term revolution in nowadays political science Georgia is worth a diagnosis of entire "revolutionary syndrome" as a similar model of the government change has taken place already a few times during the thirteen years of independence before the Rose Revolution and unsuccessful attempts to repeat it were demonstrated recently. The inquiry reveals that analysis of this phenomenon has to be performed in the context of country's political history. Otherwise, one cannot get a full and deep picture of its causes. It is not enough to refer to ad hoc success criteria of the Rose Revolution but to seek for the institutionalized thinking and behaviour patterns of the political actors which leads to the radicalization of political conflict. This goes as the second aim of this paper. The findings of this study show that the recent stagnation, if not setback, of democratization in Georgia disproves a somehow romantic scientific discourse which sees the Rose Revolution as a victory of democracy against authoritarianism. The Rose Revolution in its essence was not an extraordinary event in country's political context and not a democratic breakthrough. There are some historically formed patterns of political actors' interplay which are favourable for radicalization of political conflict. Firstly, under formally existing multi-party system, a single party permanently dominates in all branches of governance. For this reason political struggle becomes a zero-sum game. Secondly, political parties almost unexceptionally are created and dominated by a single leader. In such situation they become not organizations of political representation but more a projection of personal power and an instrument for its realization. The struggles among such parties are based not on ideological but on personal arguments. In this case, clear guidelines for solving such conflicts and making compromises do not exist. Thirdly, political leaders in Georgia tend to present themselves as apolitical. That is, they claim to represent not the interests of particular groups or ideologies but universal interests which are common to all the citizens. For this reason, a normal pluralism of interests is denied and political opponents are treated as the traitors or state enemies. Finally, a tradition of resistance to the state and bureaucratic hierarchy traces back a few centuries into Georgia's history and has acquired a self-contained value. The vitality of tradition of revolt is proved by using protest as a prevailing means of solving conflicts.