Suchergebnisse

In this paper, I intend to present an introduction to the research field of Collective Intentionality. However, I will concentrate the exposition on one particular branch of explanation of this phenomenon. In the first section, I present the problems that prompt the development of Collective Intentionality theories for the Philosophy of Action. In the second section, I determine the origin of the theoretical lineage discussed with the explanation of shared intentions, the reflexive linkage of mental states maintained by the individuals engaged in collective action, developed by Michael Bratman. In the third section, I present Deborah Tollefsen's adjustments to Bratman's proposal in order to reduce its cognitive demands and make it possible for small children to satisfy them. Finally, in the fourth section, I discuss Olle Blomberg's proposal of a socially extended intention-in-action that aims at explaining how it would be possible to embed results of other individuals' actions in the content of an individual's intention-in-action.