Suchergebnisse

Les États-Unis, architectes du système commercial de l'après-guerre, sont devenus aujourd'hui son transgresseur le plus visible. L'administration Biden n'a montré aucun intérêt pour de nouveaux accords commerciaux de quelque nature que ce soit. Les États-Unis refusent de renouveler le mandat des juges de l'Organe d'appel de l'OMC, rendant inapplicables les règles de l'OMC, à moins que les États-Unis (ou tout autre membre) ne choisissent de s'y conformer. Dans cet article, sur la base d'une perspective historique, nous examinons les causes du repli (sur soi) de la politique commerciale américaine tout en nous interrogeant sur son évolution future. Aujourd'hui encore, l'économie américaine reste parmi les plus ouvertes au monde, l'opinion publique soutient le commerce et les partisans du retrait des marchés mondiaux sont difficiles à trouver. Il semble donc difficile de voir dans le changement de politique commerciale des États-Unis une adhésion aux valeurs du protectionnisme. Une interprétation plus convaincante réside dans le fait que la politique commerciale américaine évolue, poussée – comme elle l'a été depuis la naissance de la nation – par des forces sous-jacentes, comme la montée de la Chine, l'inégalité des revenus et le changement climatique. Cela nous aide à comprendre la politique de Biden, mais sans pour autant la justifier car la politique actuelle n'est pas la bonne réponse à ces défis. En effet, si l'histoire est un guide, elle nous suggère alors qu'une autre refonte de la politique commerciale américaine est possible et même probable. Malheureusement, un retour au leadership commercial des États-Unis n'est pas envisageable de sitôt, et quand il arrivera, il sera peut-être trop tard pour sauver le système commercial fondé sur des règles.

AbstractThis article considers how policymakers should react to the disruption of Global Value Chains, which became dramatically evident during the pandemic. It argues that repeated shocks to GVCs, as seen in recent years, are not purely random and disjointed events. They are the result of fundamental shifts in the geopolitical environment, global economy, and climate. Firms have concluded that international supply chains have become endemically riskier, and this is changing their risk/efficiency calculus. But there is no reason and – so far – little evidence to suggest that GVCs will stage a large‐scale retreat. Powerful economic forces are at work that will prompt increased reliance on GVCs and improve their operability in the future. Governments tend to overreact when faced with supply shocks, and unnecessarily impede GVCs; more nuanced and coordinated responses are needed. The WTO can play an important role, promoting the resilience of GVCs.

President Trump's actions on trade have not quite matched his rhetoric, but the worst may be to come. Though the political opposition to his protectionism is formidable, so are his conviction and determination and he possesses a wide array of instruments to pursue his goals. The trade doctrine he has espoused makes for trade policy instability both at home and abroad. It may lead to a large deterioration in the operating environment of international business. America's trade-dependent industries and her trading partners should not wait. They need to anticipate and deter the administration's actions. Policies must be adjusted to minimize the damage to world trade.

President Trump's actions on trade have not quite matched his rhetoric, but the worst may be to come. Though the political opposition to his protectionism is formidable, so are his conviction and determination and he possesses a wide array of instruments to pursue his goals. The trade doctrine he has espoused makes for trade policy instability both at home and abroad. It may lead to a large deterioration in the operating environment of international business. America's trade-dependent industries and her trading partners should not wait. They need to anticipate and deter the administration's actions. Policies must be adjusted to minimize the damage to world trade.

[T]he most powerful underlying force driving increased inequality is not trade by itself but skill-biased technological change—machines and methods that reduce the need for unskilled labor and boost demand for more specialized and skilled workers.

Multitudes are escaping poverty in developing nations while rich economies stagnate.

Why have the fiscal paths of the United Kingdom (radical budget cuts) and the United States (extended tax cuts) diverged so dramatically?

The focus of the G-20 and the IMF, and of the finance ministries that set their agendas, should shift away from global rebalancing, which sounds and plays like a zero-sum game.

The European Union is very open to foreign direct investment. By comparison, despite considerable liberalisation in the past two decades, foreign investors in China's markets still face significant restrictions, especially in services sectors. Given this imbalance, the EU has long sought to improve the situation for its companies operating or wanting to operate in China. After eight years of negotiations, the EU and China concluded in December 2020 a bilateral Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). The text awaiting ratification aims to give foreign investors greater market access, enforceable via state-to-state dispute settlement. It does not yet, however, cover investor protection (such as against expropriation). Meanwhile, investor protection is covered by bilateral investment treaties between EU countries and China, which remain in force. The CAI has been met in some quarters with scepticism on economic and geopolitical grounds. The main criticism is that it provides little new market access in China, and that this small economic gain for the EU comes at the price of breaking ranks with its main political ally, the United States. Our assessment, which focuses on the economic implications, is different. It is true the CAI provides only modest new market access in China, but this is because China has already made progress in recent years in liberalising its foreign investment regulations unilaterally. The CAI binds this progress under an international treaty, marking an improvement for EU firms insofar as their market access rights can be effectively enforced. Most important, the CAI includes new rules on subsidies, state-owned enterprises, technology transfer and transparency, which will improve effective market access for EU firms operating in China. These bilateral new rules could also pave the way for reform of the multilateral rules under the World Trade Organisation, with the aim of better integrating China into the international trading and investment system - a goal shared by the EU, the United States and other like-minded countries. From an economic viewpoint therefore, the CAI is an important agreement, and one worth having. However, its ratification by the European Parliament is unlikely while China continues to apply sanctions against some members of the European Parliament and other critics of China's human rights record.

Despite tensions over China's discriminatory business practices, China's trade continues to thrive, and the country has taken over from the United States as the first destination for foreign investment. American and European businesses continue to be engaged in China's large and growing market, even amid a trade war between China and the United States. Drawing on surveys of companies and international comparisons, we show that - contrary to the prevailing narrative - China's business practices have improved significantly in recent years. China's business environment is today generally more favourable than that in other large countries at similar levels of development and, in some though certainly not all aspects, is in line with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development average. Differences over geopolitics and human rights must be addressed, but it is clear that trade and investment agreements conditioned on accelerated reforms in China would yield substantial dividends. The benefits of such deals would accrue not only to foreign investors in China and exporters to China, but also to consumers and importers in the European Union and, especially, in the US, where punitive tariffs on China remain in effect. Critical aspects in the negotiations would include better access for American and European investors to China's market for services and improved enforcement of rules and regulations in China. As in many middle-income countries, uneven enforcement of the law (rather than the law itself) remains a critical problem in China.