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The Growth and Job Creation of Spin-Offs: Empirical Evidence from Denmark
In: EVOLUTION, ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, Guido Buenstorf, ed., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011
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Knowledge flows through informal contacts in industrial clusters: myth or reality?
In: Research Policy, Band 33, Heft 10, S. 1673-1686
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Career Effects of Mental Health
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Working paper
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Entrepreneurial Couples
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Working paper
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Fatherhood and Managerial Style: How a Male CEO's Children Affect the Wages of His Employees
In: Administrative science quarterly: ASQ, Band 57, Heft 4, S. 669-693
ISSN: 1930-3815
Motivated by a growing literature in the social sciences suggesting that the transition to fatherhood has a profound effect on men's values, we study how the wages of employees change after a male chief executive officer (CEO) has children, using comprehensive panel data on the employees, CEOs, and families of CEOs in all but the smallest Danish firms between 1996 and 2006. We find that (a) a male CEO generally pays his employees less generously after fathering a child, (b) the birth of a daughter has a less negative influence on wages than does the birth of a son and has a positive influence if the daughter is the CEO's first, and (c) the wages of female employees are less adversely affected than are those of male employees and positively affected by the CEO's first child of either gender. We also find that male CEOs pay themselves more after fathering a child, especially after fathering a son. These results are consistent with a desire by the CEO to husband more resources for his family after fathering a child and the psychological priming of the CEO's generosity after the birth of his first daughter and specifically toward women after the birth of his first child of either gender.
Fatherhood and Managerial Style: How a Male CEOs Children Affect the Wages of His Employees
In: Administrative science quarterly: ASQ ; dedicated to advancing the understanding of administration through empirical investigation and theoretical analysis, Band 57, Heft 4, S. 669-693
ISSN: 0001-8392
Do Startup Employees Earn More in the Long Run?
In: Organization science, Band 32, Heft 3, S. 587-604
ISSN: 1526-5455
Evaluating the attractiveness of startup employment requires an understanding of both what startups pay and the implications of these jobs for earnings trajectories. Analyzing Danish registry data, we find that employees hired by startups earn roughly 17% less over the next 10 years than those hired by large, established firms. About half of this earnings differential stems from sorting—from the fact that startup employees have less human capital. Long-term earnings also vary depending on when individuals are hired. Although the earliest employees of startups suffer an earnings penalty, those hired by already-successful startups earn a small premium. Two factors appear to account for the earnings penalties for the early employees: Startups fail at high rates, creating costly spells of unemployment for their (former) employees. Job-mobility patterns also diverge: After being employed by a small startup, individuals rarely return to the large employers that pay more.