Donor policy rules and aid effectiveness
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 32, Heft 6, S. 1895-1920
ISSN: 0165-1889
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In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 32, Heft 6, S. 1895-1920
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6794
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Working paper
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13119
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In: The journal of development studies, Band 53, Heft 7, S. 998-1018
ISSN: 1743-9140
In: CEGE Discussion Paper No. 306, March 2017
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In: The Economic Journal, Band 126, Heft 598, S. 2292-2323
In: Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 14-21
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In: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Band 115, Heft 2, S. 423-448
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In: Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Paper No. 151
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In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 37, Heft 7, S. 1170-1181
In: Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 09-23
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In: Economica, Band 75, Heft 300, S. 629-661
ISSN: 1468-0335
This paper provides a framework that decomposes aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) into a component reflecting relative efficiency across sectors, and another component that reflects the absolute level of efficiency. A development accounting analysis suggests that as much as 85% of the international variation in aggregate TFP can be attributed to variation in relative efficiency across sectors. Estimation results show that recent findings highlighting the importance of strong protection of property rights, financial development and geographical advantage for the level of TFP, can be explained by their impact on relative efficiency.
In: The journal of development studies: JDS, Band 37, Heft 6, S. 17-41
ISSN: 0022-0388
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 33, Heft 9, S. 1639-1647
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: Dalgaard , C-J L & Olsson , O 2009 ' Why are Rich Countries more Politically Cohesive? ' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen .
We document empirically that rich countries are more politically cohesive than poorer countries. In order to explain this regularity, we provide a model where political cohesion is linked to the emergence of a fully functioning market economy. Without market exchange, the welfare of inherently selfish individuals will be mutually independent. As a result, political negotiations, echoing the preferences of the citizens of society, will be dog-eat-dog in nature. Whoever has greater bargaining power will be willing to make decisions that enhance the productivity of his supporters at the expense of other groups in society. If the gains from specialization become sufficiently large, however, a market economy will emerge. From being essentially non-cohesive under self-sufficiency, the political decision making process becomes cohesive in the market economy, as the welfare of individuals will be mutually interdependent due to the exchange of goods. We refer to this latter state as "capitalist cohesion".
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