Suchergebnisse

Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Chapter 1: Regulating Revolution: An Introduction to 3D Printing and the Law -- This Book's Approach -- A Brief History of 3D Printing -- The Revolutionary Promise of 3D Printing -- 3D Printing as the End of Scarcity: Atoms Also Want to Be Free -- 3D Printing as the End of Control -- Technodeterminism -- Outline of This Book -- Chapter 2: 'You Wouldn't Download a Car': 3D Printing and Intellectual Property -- A Brief Introduction to Intellectual Property -- Intellectual Property's Intersection with 3D Printing -- Copyright -- Computer-Aided Design File

Introduction -- The Internet, user autonomy, and EU law -- Dominance and Internet provision -- Dominance and Internet search -- Dominance and mobile devices -- Dominance and the Cloud

COVID-19 hit at a time when the United Kingdom was vulnerable, reeling from its exit from the European Union and wracked by ongoing issues over the devolved nations, particularly Northern Ireland and Scotland, both of which had voted to remain in the EU during the 2016 referendum. Scotland had its own 2014 referendum on independence from the UK, which was narrowly won by the "No" side. While a pro-Brexit, right-wing Conservative government rules in London, the devolved administration in Edinburgh is led by the center-left Scottish National Party (SNP) government and first minister Nicola Sturgeon. However, when the pandemic first hit the UK in the early months of 2020, there was no discernible difference in approach between the Scottish government and the UK Government. In March 2020, both Scotland and the wider UK imposed lockdowns later than in other European countries. By mid-March, both had abandoned manual contact tracing around the same time that "Big Tech" firms such as Palantir were invited to meetings with the UK government. Later that month, NHSX (the English public health service unit tasked with setting policy and best practice for digital technologies and data in health) started developing a contact-tracing app amid techno-deterministic claims from the Johnson administration in London that we could digitize our way out of the pandemic.

The ways in which artificial intelligence (AI), in particular facial recognition technology, is being used by the Chinese state against the Uyghur ethnic minority demonstrate how big data gathering, analysis and AI have become ubiquitous surveillance mechanisms in China. These actual uses of facial recognition will be compared with the rhetoric on AI ethics which is beginning to emerge from public and private actors in China. Implications include the mismatch between rhetoric and practice with regards to AI in China; a more global understanding of algorithmic discrimination, which in China explicitly targets and categorises Uyghur people and other ethnic minorities; and a greater awareness of AI technologies developed and used in China which may then be exported to other states, including supposed liberal democracies, and used in similar ways.

This article argues that Australia's recently-passed data breach notification legislation, the Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data Breaches) Act 2017 (Cth), and its coming into force in 2018, makes an internationally important, yet imperfect, contribution to data breach notification law. Against the backdrop of data breach legislation in the United States and European Union, a comparative analysis is undertaken between these jurisdictions and the Australian scheme to elucidate this argument. Firstly, some context to data breach notification provisions is offered, which are designed to address some of the problems data breaches cause for data privacy and information security. There have been various prominent data breaches affecting Australians over the last few years, which have led to discussion of what can be done to deal with their negative effects. The international context of data breach notification legislation will be discussed, with a focus on the United States and European Union jurisdictions, which have already adopted similar laws. The background to the adoption of the Australia legislation will be examined, including the general context of data privacy and security protection in Australia. The reform itself will be then be considered, along with the extent to which this law is fit for purpose and some outstanding concerns about its application. While data breach notification requirements are likely to be a positive step for data security, further reform is probably necessary to ensure strong cybersecurity. However, such reform should be cognisant of the international trends towards the adoption of data security measures including data breach notification, but lack of alignment in standards, which may be burdensome for entities operating in the transnational data economy.

This article presents an initial appraisal of the emerging Australian approach to applying privacy and data protection laws to automated technologies. These laws and the general context in which they operate will be explained, with appropriate comparisons made to the European Union frameworks. In order to examine their specific application vis-à-vis automated technologies, three case studies – automated facial recognition technologies (AFRT), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs – better known as 'drones') and autonomous vehicles (or 'driverless cars') – are selected to examine the extent to which existing privacy and data protection laws, and their application, can be considered adequate to address privacy and data protection risks that these technologies bring. These case studies evidence existing deficiencies with privacy protection in Australia and the inadequacy of recent reform processes, demonstrating that Australian data privacy laws are not well placed to protect individuals' rights vis-à-vis automated technologies.