S,s pricing in a dynamic equilibrium model with heterogeneous sectors
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 36, Heft 4, S. 550-567
ISSN: 0165-1889
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In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 36, Heft 4, S. 550-567
ISSN: 0165-1889
We discuss a time invariant policy which delivers the unconditionally optimal outcomes in purely forward-looking models and Ramsey outcomes in purely backward-looking models. This policy is a product of interaction between two institutions with distinct responsibilities. Motivated by Brendon and Ellison (2015), we think of them as arms of government. One institution is responsible for 'forward guidance', setting rules which are necessary and sufficient to determine private expectations. The second institution implements optimal policy taking expectations as given. The forward guidance rules are designed to maximise the unconditional expectation of the social objectives.
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Should we break up banks and limit bailouts? We study vertical integration of deposit-taking institutions with those investing in risky equity. Integration eliminates a credit spread, reducing aggregate banking sector profitability; so while integration increases output it also entails larger, more frequent bailouts of retail customers. Bailouts boost economic activity but are costly. The optimal structure of banking depends on the efficiency of government intervention, the competitiveness of the banking sectors and shocks. Separated institutions are preferred when government bailouts are costly. Optimal bank regulation tolerates profits at investment and universal banks to limit bailouts, but imposes strict antitrust on retail banks.
BASE
Should we break up banks and limit bailouts? We study vertical integration of deposit-taking institutions with those investing in risky equity. Integration eliminates a credit spread, reducing aggregate banking sector profitability; so while integration increases output it also entails larger, more frequent bailouts of retail customers. Bailouts boost economic activity but are costly. The optimal structure of banking depends on the efficiency of government intervention, the competitiveness of the banking sectors and shocks. Separated institutions are preferred when government bailouts are costly. Optimal bank regulation tolerates profits at investment and universal banks to limit bailouts, but imposes strict antitrust on retail banks.
BASE
In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Band 55, Heft 3, S. 491-500