Suchergebnisse

This paper studies the role of the European Union (EU) in supporting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) communities in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) by focusing on the case of Lebanon. It seeks to fill the existing gap in the literature regarding the transversal conceptualization of EU practices in support of LGBTI communities in the MENA by focusing on what is happening on the ground. The paper builds on semi-structured interviews and engages with primary and secondary literature on practices in international relations and the EU's transversal democracy promotion to answer three main questions: To what extent do the EU agents engage with local actors to improve transversal minority rights? Who are the agents involved? And what influences the EU approach/practice in this area? The main findings reveal the EU as a subtle actor when it comes to LGBTI rights in the MENA; it tends to treat the matter within a broader human rights aspect and to support initiatives taken by locals. This is due to the sensitivity of the domestic context as well as awareness that it might have a negative effect on the LGBTI groups if the EU became more vocal.

The article analyses the EU's approach for democracy promotion in Tunisia and Egypt in the wake of the Arab uprisings. Contrary to arguments that focus either on the EU institutions and member states or on the domestic policies of the targeted countries and see the post-2010 EU democracy promotion strategies as a continuation of previous programs, the article follows a more eclectic approach. By considering changes both at the EU and the international level, it argues that the EU appears as a pragmatic yet more flexible and reactive international actor. After 2010, the EU frames for democracy promotion have changed and are differentiated in the two MENA countries. Crucial to this cognitive change is the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) and the role that domestic elites have played in the two case studies.

Poland's road to the euro proved bumpy and its early status as a euro pacesetter developed into one of euro laggard. So why, prior to the sovereign debt crisis, did Poland remain among the group of Central and East European countries that had not yet adopted the euro? What are the political barriers for euro adoption in Poland? This paper argues that domestic factors such as the existence of veto points, public opinion, central bank institutional features, and the role of political elites are key to answering the research questions. With the euro crises, the domestic problems were accompanied by declining public support for euro adoption along with an unfavorable external environment that is pushing euro adoption further away. Adapted from the source document.

Following the Arab Spring, one might expect a paradigm shift in the EU's attitude towards the MENA - at least with respect to democracy promotion. However, the EU response has been neither consistent nor coherent. This paper seeks to answer the following questions: How did the EU react to the Arab Spring events in North Africa? Is there evidence of any change in the goals and instruments pursued by the EU after the Arab Spring? And, do these goals and instruments change coherently across countries? The paper argues, first, that EU goals remain security and stability driven. While the EU viewed the Arab Spring as a window of opportunity for democracy, as events developed the EU prioritized security concerns as a response to the threat of instability in the MENA. And second, the utilization of instruments varied across time and cases due to the domestic politics of the targeted countries. Adapted from the source document.