Suchergebnisse

This study presents an institutional theory for career behaviour in the European Parliament (EP). By focusing on the professional ambition of members of the EP (MEPs), the study presents a rigorous analysis of the powerful multinational legislature from within - problematising the link between institutional change and individual action, as evidenced in the career paths taken by MEPs. The study has implications for the nexus of institutional change and the behaviour of the political elite, broadly, as well as the study of representative democracy in the EU, specifically

AbstractThis article examines the assignment of legislative rapporteurships to Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Original data sources are used to test the assumption that committee reports are routinely awarded to MEPs with higher levels of education and seniority at the European level. The hypotheses are supported by an extensive multivariate regression analysis, which also demonstrates the increasing value of rapporteurships, following the initiation of Parliament's veto player status under co‐decision. The article surpasses existing accounts of committee work in the European Parliament to include data on the individual balance of legislative power for the legislature's full history, 1979–2009.