Suchergebnisse

A central question in terms of political (self-)selection relates to the incentives leading high ability individuals to enter – or abstain from entering – into politics. In this article, we use data from Italian municipalities over the period 1985-2012 to empirically assess how changes in individuals' expected payoffs affect political (self-)selection. Identification derives from murders of local politicians by the mafia, and indicates that such a negative shock to politicians' expected payoffs induces a strong decrease in first-time elected politicians' human capital. The effect is not limited to the municipality where a political murder takes place, but also extends to nearby municipalities.

We study how policies limiting the spending capacity of local governments may reduce corruption. We exploit the extension of one such policy, the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP), to small Italian municipalities. The DSP led to a decrease in both recorded corruption rates and corruption charges per euro spent. This effect emerges only in areas in which the DSP put a binding cap on municipal capital expenditures. The reduction in corruption is linked to accountability incentives as it emerges mostly in pre-electoral years and for re-eligible mayors. We then estimate the impact of the extension of the DSP on local public good provision in the following years, finding a null effect in the short run. Overall, our findings suggest that budget constraints might induce local governments to curb expenditures in a way that dampens their exposure to corruption without depressing local welfare.

We study how policies limiting the spending capacity of local governments may reduce corruption. We exploit the extension of one such policy, the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP), to small Italian municipalities. The DSP led to a decrease in both recorded corruption rates and corruption charges per euro spent. This effect emerges only in areas in which the DSP put a binding cap on municipal capital expenditures. The reduction in corruption is linked to accountability incentives as it emerges mostly in pre-electoral years and for reeligible mayors. We then estimate the impact of the extension of the DSP on local public goods provision in the following years, finding a null effect in the short run. Overall, our findings suggest that budget constraints might induce local governments to curb expenditures in a way that dampens their exposure to corruption without depressing local public goods provision. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

In this paper, we study how policies limiting the spending capacity of local governments may lead to a reduction in corruption. We exploit the extension of one such policy, the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP), to Italian municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants that occurred in 2013. Using a 'local Difference-in-Differences' approach, we show that the extension of the DSP led to a substantial decrease in recorded corruption rates. This effect emerges only in areas in which the DSP put a binding cap on municipal capital expenditures, in line with the hypothesis that investments and procurement are naturally prone to corruptive phenomena. We also show that i) the reduction in corruption is linked to accountability incentives; ii) and it is not just a mechanical consequence of the decrease in investments, by pointing out evidence of an improvement in the corruption-proofness of public spending. We then estimate the impact of the extension of the DSP on local welfare, finding a null effect. Overall, our findings suggest that budget constrains might induce local governments to curb expenditures in a way that dampens their exposure to corruption without depressing local welfare.

Families often play a significant role in representative democracies. In this paper, we test the extent to which dynastic and non-dynastic leaders differ in their policy making. Our empirical analysis focuses on local politics in Italy, using a large sample of mayors and mayoral candidates in the period 1985–2012. We highlight that dynastic candidates have more successful political careers and that power is self-perpetuating, as those in power are more likely to establish a dynasty. We then test whether dynastic mayors enforce different policies than their non-dynastic counterparts. We find no effect on average spending, revenues or transfers. Conversely, we show that dynastic mayors increase spending and obtain higher transfers during the year prior to an election, especially when they are eligible to run for re-election. We discuss mechanisms that might explain this strategic behavior.