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The venture capital market in Kazakhstan has been developing since the early 2000s. With state support, venture funds and innovation infrastructure (science parks, accelerators, etc.) were formed. The results of these efforts, however, were modest. Rapid growth of the Kazakhstan venture sector since late 2010s was spurred by the development of the Internet markets. Despite some success stories, the sector is at an early stage of its growth. The potential for commercialization is low, emerging technologies are absent, and financial instruments are not developed. The main problem is not the effectiveness of national policy, but the framework limitations of Kazakhstan`s economy. These are insufficient R&D; dominance of extractive industries; small domestic market and weak potential for regional scaling. Global players are more interested in supporting individual projects rather than in developing Kazakhstan`s venture market. Outcomes of 2022 create new challenges and opportunities for Kazakhstan. However, without correction of national policy, the venture sector will still face limits to growth – even in the most promising Internet markets.

Since 2010s growth of the biggest Internet corporations (Big Tech) formed new monopolization challenges, from takeovers of competing start-ups to anti-competitive practices. Initially, regulators were not active, considering complexity of antitrust policies for the high-tech sector (e.g., not to demotivate R&D investments) and specifics of Internet markets (network effects, etc.). But since 2020 situation changed dramatically. Despite the active EU's role in developing model digital norms, special attention should be paid to the U.S.A. and China (as countries of origin of Big Tech and key Internet markets). In both economies, regulators previously executed a non-restrictive approach to the Internet markets and Big Tech, also as factor supporting their development and global leadership. But rising challenges and political events triggered new antitrust attack. For the PRC it was Jack Ma's speech amid rising concerns of the CPC leaders about income asymmetries. In the U.S.A. it was Trumpists' war on the "liberal media" and changes in long-term "alliance" between Democrats and Big Tech. Since 2020 China started antitrust investigations against Big Tech and other Internet corporations, imposed fines, and developed new regulations. In the U.S.A., due to the specifics of the legal and political system, focus was made on forming political and legal basis for further regulatory actions. Several lawsuits were initiated, critics of Internet monopolies were assigned on key positions in federal antitrust bodies, while Congress elaborated draft acts. Theoretical analysis shows that in both nations focus was made on the sharpest (for society and politicians) changes. New initiatives do not pose a threat to Big Tech's innovation activities yet. Less obvious is their correspondence to the digital economy specifics. So, it is still hard to understand whether these actions will lead to rise of innovations and competition. Long-term systematic development of regulation is needed – as well as serious theoretical research on "digital antitrust".

The "technological war" between the United States and China that started in 2017–2018 raises a number of questions about the future role of technological development as a factor in relations between superpowers. Analysis shows that for the United States this conflict is caused by changing balance of risks and benefits of the liberal model of globalization due to the rise of China`s power and growing geopolitical tensions between the two nations. In this context, emerging, especially digital, technologies appear to be a new battlefield between superpowers. Within the realist framework, actors consider emerging technologies as a key factor for strengthening their global postures. This, among other things, contributes to securitized technological agenda and strengthens its geopolitical dimension. Neo-technonationalism has become the platform that integrates different processes and goals into new U.S. policy. Although historically neo-technonationalism took its roots in Asia, the evolving market situation prompted the United States to rethink existing approaches and to upgrade the techno-nationalist dimension of its policy. Considering similar policies of China and the EU (i. e. the European digital sovereignty policy), this trend shapes new realities of technological "blocs", the struggle for expansion of technological platforms, and technological conflicts. Taking into account prospective development needs of the global economy and future specification of mutual interest areas, as new digital technologies mature, the ground for normalizing the dialogue between the superpowers will emerge. However, at least in the U.S.–China case, this issue will be complicated by geopolitical contradictions that leave little room for any serious compromise.

Superplatforms – diversified digital corporations from the United States (Amazon, Google and others grouped in FAMGA/GAFAM) and China (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent) dominating the Internet markets – are the leading actors of digital economy. In terms of revenue, markets, and capitalization they are already among the largest multinational corporations. Many basic factors of their success are still in place, but increased competition, diminishing importance of low base effects and other challenges forced them to sharpen focus on innovations and emerging technologies since late 2000s – early 2010s. This process was supported by a strong influx of capital from financial markets. As a result, superplatforms executed strong growth of research and development (R&D) expenditures and investments in venture markets – especially in the domain of emerging technologies. By the end of 2010s, superplatforms appeared among leading technology and innovation actors of respective National Innovation Systems (NIS) in terms of their share of national business R&D, venture investments and because of unique role in promoting digital transformation of the U.S.A. and China. It may also be stated, that superplatforms now are an important factor of both potential and competitiveness of the superpowers, including issues of digital sovereignty. For the future, disruptive innovations and technologies will still be in focus of the superplatforms. This is especially true since superplatforms need new quality of innovative development: further accelerated increase of R&D and venture investments seem to be almost impossible in new realm of the financial markets. The process will be more influenced by the external factors, than in the previous decade. (Among them are changes in the regulatory environment – also to compensate challenging monopolistic behaviors of FAMGA and BAT; changing global trade and investment dynamics – including technological "war" between the U.S.A. and China; rise of global competition). As a result, we may envision further rise of importance of the superplatforms for NIS and their transformation into a new factor of economic and digital power – and new arena of global competition for the U.S.A. and China.

The paper examines the so-called U.S.-China "tech war" of 2017–2020 in the sphere of cutting-edge digital technologies, its origins, factors, and other aspects, with a focus on the American strategy to limit China's opportunities for technological development. The purpose of this study is to conceptualise the American tech war strategy and to assess the character and prospects of technology conflicts. The article represents the study with the use of comparative, historical approaches, the elements of systematic economic analysis, and some elements of neorealist and constructivist approaches. Based on the examination of key drivers of the tech war (with regard to the U.S. position), as well as the comparative historical analysis of the observed processes and the instruments implemented to fight for technological leadership, it concludes that technology conflictis a new phenomenon, determined, among other things, by the specifics of digital technologies and economic changes of recent decades, which at the same time preserves natural continuity in relation to the past geopolitical and economic conflicts and existing strategies and tools. Taking into account the peculiarities of the new conflict and digital technologies it deduces that it is possible to describe the U.S. policy in the framework of an adjusted concept of neo-techno nationalism (strengthening national technological potential and sovereignty through global economic instruments). It is noted that in the context of the digital revolution and in the analysis of the clash of superpowers this concept implies that goals are achieved through providing preferential access to such specific development resources as global human capital and big primary data, the formation of systems of standards, etc. In the conclusion, it is highlighted that the U.S. strategy under Trump, which led to a tougher American course in the tech war with China, was determined by objective circumstances as well as by personal traits of the president. In particular, such circumstances include the need to break old ineffective practices to design new solutions and approaches. The author draws a conclusion that in the future the United States will focus on building techno-economic regimes as a more systemic strategy for waging a technology conflict considering adjusted neo-techno national logic.

Discussions on the impact of digital technologies on national and global processes are rising. Among important issues is the role of large Internet platforms (Facebook, Google, Alibaba, etc.) - key players of the digital markets and in the digital innovations – in producing global leadership / dominance. The article argues, that on the economy side existing USA-China duopoly on the platform markets creates asymmetric advantages for both nations resulting (in future) in unprecedented influence on global processes (up to "digital colonialism"). It is doubtful that potential competitors from third nations may ever destroy this duopoly. Also, the information functions of the platforms are reviewed as resource for global leadership. Noting the evolution of assessments (from techno-optimistic views of platforms as engines of democracy to alarmist views of their role as a "backdoor" for the opponents and adversaries) we accent platform`s growing information impact on the global processes (digital diplomacy, etc.). However, here the USA-PRC duopoly is also actual. Dilemma of alternative solutions to boost the influence of third nations in the new digital, platform economy still may be resolved. Since data is the key resource for the digital markets and platforms, formation of data regulatory regimes appears to be an asymmetric solution. The experience of the EU with its GDPR and other efforts to form new data/digital regimes may serve as a model. Exploiting its` large data market as a competitive factor, the EU may neutralize part of the advantages of stronger actors and orient global platforms towards a more acceptable strategy. However, regulatory practices should be complemented by the development of digital technologies, as well as regional- or national-level platforms. A serious challenge also lies in achieving needed market scale (in order to influence global platforms) and – in the future – in competition of jurisdictions.

Intensive development of manufacturing capabilities of Taiwan and Republic of Korea (RoK) since 1960s leads to their emergence as key global semiconductor asset. Until 2020/2021 TSMC and Samsung supplied almost 100% of most technologically advanced chips. The U. S. considered this situation as critical dependence – both for political (conflict with China, securitization of digital technologies, etc.) and economic reasons (risks of supply distortions). Along with science and technology (S&T) efforts major accent was put on new relations with Taiwan and RoK as sources of investments and competences needed to regain U.S. capabilities. By forcing and stimulating TSMC and Samsung to localize its facilities in the USA, American elites tried to solve set of different tasks. Among them were supporting strategic technological autonomy from Asia, and limiting Chinese potential for development (by requiring non-cooperation with PRC in exchange for subsidies). However, due to economic, regulatory, and competence drawbacks efficiency of this new strategy is questionable. Crisis in the electronic industry since the fall of 2022 makes the situation even more problematic. In the mid-term the strategy may not change the balance of power in microchip manufacturing and architecture of relationship with both Asian economies. This requires further development of American economic diplomacy toward Taiwan, RoK – as well as Japan (a so-called "Chip 4" group). This coincides with changes in market dynamics of semiconductor industry. On one hand, geopolitics and value chain resilience became organic factors defining investments and operational expenses. On the other, we may envision sharp rise of competition among nations and companies. Thus, for the long-term success may be determined only by S&T and Innovations (also through industry restructuring) where USA are still strong, but their success isn't guaranteed anymore.

The analysis of current solutions and long-term budgetary programs announced in the U.S., the EU, China and some other countries, that the authors of the article rest upon, indicates the rise of attention to innovation policy as a tool for anti-crisis measures and long-range structural reforms. The increase of the inherent economies' producibility in energy and ecology area, transportation, information and telecommunication systems, health care is the insurance of the developed nations' long-term competitiveness. Advanced technologies in these sectors will allow the developed countries to form a new post-crisis technological mode able to facilitate the outlines of the dynamic economic growth, world economic leadership, as well as to solve social problems.

In the last decade, the foundations of the digital economy have been formed with Internet platforms becoming its largest and most important segment. According to the authors, one of the key problems associated with the development of the digital economy and of Internet platforms is the diffusion of existing and generation of the new competencies. This is important both for platform users and partner companies. The article analyzes the role of platforms in this process and highlights the main channels for competence diffusion. Firstly, individual and, secondly, institutional dimensions of these processes are defined. In the first case, the authors elaborate on the ways of developing user competencies - both basic and specialized. In the second case, the article focuses on the distribution of organizational and institutional competencies, and best practices among partner companies and participants in corporate ecosystems of platforms. For the partners the primary conditions for acquiring new competencies depend, firstly, on a system of organizational and economic requirements of the platforms. Secondly — on specific digital interfaces. Growth and improvement of services, technology, dynamics and principles of platform market organization provide formation and diffusion of more complex economic and technical competences of digital economy. It is shown that a new powerful source of development and transfer of promising technological and economic competences within the extended platform ecosystems is also being formed. The scope of operations of modern digital platforms, their composition, engagement of all key groups of actors in the innovation processes (including consumers) create unique opportunities for further development of this area.

Just like in the Cold War, space has re-emerged as an arena of international rivalry. However, this time, the space industry sees new actors partaking in the race to the top, as the competition is not just between states; commercial players are increasingly taking the field. The latter is not limited to established large companies but includes small and medium-sized innovative enterprises, forming the so-called New Space. Among the countries facing such a multifaceted challenge is India, whose space industry is pursuing a catch-up strategy in many respects and has only recently stepped up the growth of the commercial space segment.Considering the key importance of the public support for this segment, the article discusses the main trends, factors, and specifics of the Indian New Space policy. We use comparative analysis to assess the current state and prospects of the industry and its possible implications for the Indian global positions.The study shows that New Delhi aims to embrace new realities amidst ambitious economic targets, social challenges, and growing geopolitical tensions with China, with the pandemic acting as a catalyst. Thanks to innovative measures, India has already become one of the central space players, but it still falls short of leadership in the New Space due to its resourceconstrained and state-centered course. Nevertheless, although its New Space is still at its infant stage, the future looks promising. However, the success of the Indian astropreneurs will also depend on the rise of efficiency of the national policies – a process likely to happen due to internal and global challenges.

By 2021, the nature of the key factors that will determine the dynamics of the EU–China relations in the medium term has become clearer. The pandemic accelerated many ongoing processes in the world, revealed "weak points" in national and regional economies and security, and exposed the true intentions of international actors. The authors proceed from the working hypothesis that an ideologized rigid approach with elements of pragmatism will dominate in the EU–China relations in the post-crisis period. The balance in the formula of these relations "partner, competitor, rival" will significantly depend on the position of the United States, as well as the European Union's compliance with the "bloc discipline". Competition in the field of technology will be of key importance, but the struggle for political and ideological leadership in the changing world order will also become more acute. The political response of the EU and China to technological challenges will represent a mix of protectionism and neo-techno-nationalism. Politicians in the European Union feel that toughness toward Beijing is well received by the voters. At the same time, the EU member states diverge in their approaches to China, although the efforts are made to harmonise policies both in the European Union and in the transatlantic community. In its turn, the PRC feels more confident in the technological and political competition. The pace of China catching up with the technological abilities of the EU is impressive, though significant gaps remain. Beijing does not have intentions of de-coupling from the West and keeps a strong interest in being present in the EU markets, but it becomes more selective with regard to foreign investments at home. Meanwhile, the global shift of world politics to Asia will require adjustment on the part of the European Union. A possible approach already tested in expert discussions is further engagement with trading partners and blocs in the region, especially the newly established Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. The EU–China relations and their influence, in particular, on Russia were the subject of case study organized by the Center for Situational Analysis of IMEMO RAN. For details see: Analysis and Forecasting. IMEMO Journal, 2021, no. 2. (Available at: https:// www.afjournal.ru/index.php?page_id=464#).

The West is concerned over the crisis of the liberal world order attributing it to the conduct of emerging powers, such as China, India and Russia. Are its concerns legitimate? Drawing on social identity theory, the authors analyze the emerging powers' stances on international development through the lens of status dynamics. In particular, three issue areas are investigated: the debate over the UN development agenda, which has revealed differences between Western and non-Western approaches, the changes in the membership of donor and recipient groups over the last decade and the discourse of emerging countries concerning science and technology, which betrays their self-image of a "developed" or "laggard" state.The key finding of the paper is that the crisis of the liberal world order as a set of institutions created by the US-led countries after WWII manifests itself in the distorting symbolic exchange between developed and developing countries. The emerging states are unwilling to recognize the authority of the West and its leadership in setting the direction of global development. Meanwhile, they are trying to gain the status of development front-runners using their own foreign aid programs and science and technology development strategies. However, the rising states are not uniform and consistent in posing a symbolic challenge to the liberal order – while the Russia is striving for a "developed non-western country" status (thereby copying the USSR's image), India and China, though to different degrees, are positioning themselves both as developed industrial states and as developing countries which receive aid packages from richer members of the international community. What leads to the distortions in this symbolic exchange is the desire of some emerging powers to use the resources of the West and reap the benefits of the world order created by it while denying it a high status. Thus, a classic economic "free-rider problem" arises in international relations: while benefiting from the liberal order created by the West, the rising states do not recognize the status it ascribes itself ignoring the symbolic hierarchy which, as viewed by western countries, underlies this order.The authors declare the absence of conflict of interest.