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The paper examines the so-called U.S.-China "tech war" of 2017–2020 in the sphere of cutting-edge digital technologies, its origins, factors, and other aspects, with a focus on the American strategy to limit China's opportunities for technological development. The purpose of this study is to conceptualise the American tech war strategy and to assess the character and prospects of technology conflicts. The article represents the study with the use of comparative, historical approaches, the elements of systematic economic analysis, and some elements of neorealist and constructivist approaches. Based on the examination of key drivers of the tech war (with regard to the U.S. position), as well as the comparative historical analysis of the observed processes and the instruments implemented to fight for technological leadership, it concludes that technology conflictis a new phenomenon, determined, among other things, by the specifics of digital technologies and economic changes of recent decades, which at the same time preserves natural continuity in relation to the past geopolitical and economic conflicts and existing strategies and tools. Taking into account the peculiarities of the new conflict and digital technologies it deduces that it is possible to describe the U.S. policy in the framework of an adjusted concept of neo-techno nationalism (strengthening national technological potential and sovereignty through global economic instruments). It is noted that in the context of the digital revolution and in the analysis of the clash of superpowers this concept implies that goals are achieved through providing preferential access to such specific development resources as global human capital and big primary data, the formation of systems of standards, etc. In the conclusion, it is highlighted that the U.S. strategy under Trump, which led to a tougher American course in the tech war with China, was determined by objective circumstances as well as by personal traits of the president. In particular, such circumstances include the need to break old ineffective practices to design new solutions and approaches. The author draws a conclusion that in the future the United States will focus on building techno-economic regimes as a more systemic strategy for waging a technology conflict considering adjusted neo-techno national logic.

Discussions on the impact of digital technologies on national and global processes are rising. Among important issues is the role of large Internet platforms (Facebook, Google, Alibaba, etc.) - key players of the digital markets and in the digital innovations – in producing global leadership / dominance. The article argues, that on the economy side existing USA-China duopoly on the platform markets creates asymmetric advantages for both nations resulting (in future) in unprecedented influence on global processes (up to "digital colonialism"). It is doubtful that potential competitors from third nations may ever destroy this duopoly. Also, the information functions of the platforms are reviewed as resource for global leadership. Noting the evolution of assessments (from techno-optimistic views of platforms as engines of democracy to alarmist views of their role as a "backdoor" for the opponents and adversaries) we accent platform`s growing information impact on the global processes (digital diplomacy, etc.). However, here the USA-PRC duopoly is also actual. Dilemma of alternative solutions to boost the influence of third nations in the new digital, platform economy still may be resolved. Since data is the key resource for the digital markets and platforms, formation of data regulatory regimes appears to be an asymmetric solution. The experience of the EU with its GDPR and other efforts to form new data/digital regimes may serve as a model. Exploiting its` large data market as a competitive factor, the EU may neutralize part of the advantages of stronger actors and orient global platforms towards a more acceptable strategy. However, regulatory practices should be complemented by the development of digital technologies, as well as regional- or national-level platforms. A serious challenge also lies in achieving needed market scale (in order to influence global platforms) and – in the future – in competition of jurisdictions.

In the last decade, the foundations of the digital economy have been formed with Internet platforms becoming its largest and most important segment. According to the authors, one of the key problems associated with the development of the digital economy and of Internet platforms is the diffusion of existing and generation of the new competencies. This is important both for platform users and partner companies. The article analyzes the role of platforms in this process and highlights the main channels for competence diffusion. Firstly, individual and, secondly, institutional dimensions of these processes are defined. In the first case, the authors elaborate on the ways of developing user competencies - both basic and specialized. In the second case, the article focuses on the distribution of organizational and institutional competencies, and best practices among partner companies and participants in corporate ecosystems of platforms. For the partners the primary conditions for acquiring new competencies depend, firstly, on a system of organizational and economic requirements of the platforms. Secondly — on specific digital interfaces. Growth and improvement of services, technology, dynamics and principles of platform market organization provide formation and diffusion of more complex economic and technical competences of digital economy. It is shown that a new powerful source of development and transfer of promising technological and economic competences within the extended platform ecosystems is also being formed. The scope of operations of modern digital platforms, their composition, engagement of all key groups of actors in the innovation processes (including consumers) create unique opportunities for further development of this area.

Just like in the Cold War, space has re-emerged as an arena of international rivalry. However, this time, the space industry sees new actors partaking in the race to the top, as the competition is not just between states; commercial players are increasingly taking the field. The latter is not limited to established large companies but includes small and medium-sized innovative enterprises, forming the so-called New Space. Among the countries facing such a multifaceted challenge is India, whose space industry is pursuing a catch-up strategy in many respects and has only recently stepped up the growth of the commercial space segment.Considering the key importance of the public support for this segment, the article discusses the main trends, factors, and specifics of the Indian New Space policy. We use comparative analysis to assess the current state and prospects of the industry and its possible implications for the Indian global positions.The study shows that New Delhi aims to embrace new realities amidst ambitious economic targets, social challenges, and growing geopolitical tensions with China, with the pandemic acting as a catalyst. Thanks to innovative measures, India has already become one of the central space players, but it still falls short of leadership in the New Space due to its resourceconstrained and state-centered course. Nevertheless, although its New Space is still at its infant stage, the future looks promising. However, the success of the Indian astropreneurs will also depend on the rise of efficiency of the national policies – a process likely to happen due to internal and global challenges.

The West is concerned over the crisis of the liberal world order attributing it to the conduct of emerging powers, such as China, India and Russia. Are its concerns legitimate? Drawing on social identity theory, the authors analyze the emerging powers' stances on international development through the lens of status dynamics. In particular, three issue areas are investigated: the debate over the UN development agenda, which has revealed differences between Western and non-Western approaches, the changes in the membership of donor and recipient groups over the last decade and the discourse of emerging countries concerning science and technology, which betrays their self-image of a "developed" or "laggard" state.The key finding of the paper is that the crisis of the liberal world order as a set of institutions created by the US-led countries after WWII manifests itself in the distorting symbolic exchange between developed and developing countries. The emerging states are unwilling to recognize the authority of the West and its leadership in setting the direction of global development. Meanwhile, they are trying to gain the status of development front-runners using their own foreign aid programs and science and technology development strategies. However, the rising states are not uniform and consistent in posing a symbolic challenge to the liberal order – while the Russia is striving for a "developed non-western country" status (thereby copying the USSR's image), India and China, though to different degrees, are positioning themselves both as developed industrial states and as developing countries which receive aid packages from richer members of the international community. What leads to the distortions in this symbolic exchange is the desire of some emerging powers to use the resources of the West and reap the benefits of the world order created by it while denying it a high status. Thus, a classic economic "free-rider problem" arises in international relations: while benefiting from the liberal order created by the West, the rising states do not recognize the status it ascribes itself ignoring the symbolic hierarchy which, as viewed by western countries, underlies this order.The authors declare the absence of conflict of interest.